TIGER: Inverting Transformer Gradients via Embedding-Subspace Distance Optimization
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 18, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.18312v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning allows multiple clients to jointly train a shared model by sending gradient updates to a central server while keeping raw inputs local. However, prior gradient inversion attacks show that these updates can reveal enough information to reconstruct client inputs. Existing attacks on transformers either optimize dummy inputs to match the true client updates, which is costly and unstable for modern models, or exploit the low rank of
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 16 Jun 2026]
TIGER: Inverting Transformer Gradients via Embedding-Subspace Distance Optimization
William Kalikman, Ivo Petrov, Dimitar I. Dimitrov, Martin Vechev
Federated learning allows multiple clients to jointly train a shared model by sending gradient updates to a central server while keeping raw inputs local. However, prior gradient inversion attacks show that these updates can reveal enough information to reconstruct client inputs. Existing attacks on transformers either optimize dummy inputs to match the true client updates, which is costly and unstable for modern models, or exploit the low rank of attention gradients to identify a subspace containing the true layer embeddings, followed by a discrete membership test for candidate tokens. However, this token test is brittle under numerical noise, i.e., from quantization or Differential Privacy (DP), and scales poorly for encoder models with non-causal attention. We introduce TIGER, a continuous gradient inversion attack that turns this subspace signal into a differentiable objective. Instead of searching over tokens or matching full gradients, TIGER directly optimizes token embeddings to minimize their distance to the subspace. Our experiments demonstrate that on encoder-only models, TIGER substantially improves both reconstruction quality and runtime over existing attacks, while on decoder models, TIGER is more robust than prior subspace-based attacks, enabling the first successful reconstructions in DP-defended federated learning settings.
Comments: 16 pages, 13 pages main text,
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
ACM classes: I.2.11
Cite as: arXiv:2606.18312 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.18312v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.18312
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From: Ivo Petrov [view email]
[v1] Tue, 16 Jun 2026 10:24:40 UTC (236 KB)
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