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Seeing Is Not Screening: Multimodal Hidden Instruction Attacks on Agent Skill Scanners

arXiv Security Archived Jun 17, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.18198v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent skills are emerging as an important attack surface in LLM-based systems. Through an empirical study of existing skill scanners, we find that current defenses primarily rely on textual descriptions, manifests, and source code as the main signals for security analysis, which can leave visually conveyed malicious intent insufficiently examined. This creates a practical blind spot: harmful operational instructions hidden in images may bypass scan

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 16 Jun 2026] Seeing Is Not Screening: Multimodal Hidden Instruction Attacks on Agent Skill Scanners Xiaojun Jia, Jie Liao, Simeng Qin, Ke Ma, Wenbo Guo, Yebo Feng, Aishan Liu, Yang Liu Agent skills are emerging as an important attack surface in LLM-based systems. Through an empirical study of existing skill scanners, we find that current defenses primarily rely on textual descriptions, manifests, and source code as the main signals for security analysis, which can leave visually conveyed malicious intent insufficiently examined. This creates a practical blind spot: harmful operational instructions hidden in images may bypass scanning while still being recoverable by multimodal agents during deployment. To systematically investigate this threat, we propose SkillCamo, a document-mediated multimodal instruction attack that conceals malicious instructions within images bundled with a skill while rewriting the surrounding documentation to naturally reference those images as part of the normal workflow. Thus, the attack does not rely on the image alone, but on the joint interpretation of textual guidance and visual payload at execution time. To defend against such attacks, we further propose ExecScan, an execution-grounded multimodal scanning module that performs intent extraction, behavior reconstruction, abuse assessment, and deliberative execution simulation over skill artifacts. ExecScan jointly analyzes documentation, code, referenced resources, and visual content to recover hidden instructions, reconstruct executable behavior chains, and identify downstream risks such as exfiltration, destruction, persistence, deception, and privilege escalation. Extensive experiments show that image-hidden malicious instructions challenge existing skill scanners, while ExecScan can improve the skill scanning performance. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV) Cite as: arXiv:2606.18198 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.18198v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.18198 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Xiaojun Jia [view email] [v1] Tue, 16 Jun 2026 17:29:11 UTC (669 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.CV References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 17, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 17, 2026
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