CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Jun 17, 2026

Anywhere, Any-Stymie: Remote Activation of Trojan Malware on LiDAR with Modulated Signals

arXiv Security Archived Jun 17, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.17562v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LiDAR sensors are widely deployed in autonomous systems for 3D perception and safety-critical decision-making. We identify a previously unexplored attack surface in which dormant malware embedded in the LiDAR sensing pipeline remains inactive during normal operation and can be externally triggered after deployment, without requiring access to sensor hardware or networking at attack time. To operationalize this threat, we design malware capable of l

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 16 Jun 2026] Anywhere, Any-Stymie: Remote Activation of Trojan Malware on LiDAR with Modulated Signals R. Spencer Hallyburton, Miroslav Pajic LiDAR sensors are widely deployed in autonomous systems for 3D perception and safety-critical decision-making. We identify a previously unexplored attack surface in which dormant malware embedded in the LiDAR sensing pipeline remains inactive during normal operation and can be externally triggered after deployment, without requiring access to sensor hardware or networking at attack time. To operationalize this threat, we design malware capable of low-level point-cloud manipulation and embed it into LiDAR firmware. This malware was developed in a closed research test environment with vendor technical support, rather than by exploiting an inherent production supply-chain vulnerability. To selectively trigger attack activation, we design and implement an optical trigger that remotely activates the malware by delivering a modulated signal into the sensing environment. Once triggered, the malware performs real-time point cloud manipulation, and we demonstrate false object injection and real object suppression on static and mobile victim platforms. Our evaluation first establishes attack feasibility, including static operation at 300~ft and recorded drive-by runs reaching 35~mph. We then illustrate quantitatively that injected person-like artifacts can remain semantically detectable by a state-of-the-art 3D object detector. Finally, we demonstrate multiple modes of safety-critical impact on a deployed tactical autonomous vehicle. Together, these results highlight the need for stronger integrity guarantees throughout the LiDAR sensor development and deployment pipeline. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Systems and Control (eess.SY) Cite as: arXiv:2606.17562 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.17562v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.17562 Focus to learn more Submission history From: R. Spencer Hallyburton [view email] [v1] Tue, 16 Jun 2026 06:07:41 UTC (56,337 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.SY eess eess.SY References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 17, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 17, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗