Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in Neuro-Symbolic AI
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 17, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.17223v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Neuro-symbolic AI (NeSy) pairs neural perception with symbolic reasoning, making it attractive for high-stakes domains where explainability and structured inference are required. However, this hybrid architecture introduces an enlarged attack surface spanning five layers: neural perception, symbolic knowledge bases, reasoning engines, agentic orchestration, and data stores -- each exploitable in ways absent from purely neural systems. This paper ma
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 15 Jun 2026]
Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in Neuro-Symbolic AI
Manoj Parmar
Neuro-symbolic AI (NeSy) pairs neural perception with symbolic reasoning, making it attractive for high-stakes domains where explainability and structured inference are required. However, this hybrid architecture introduces an enlarged attack surface spanning five layers: neural perception, symbolic knowledge bases, reasoning engines, agentic orchestration, and data stores -- each exploitable in ways absent from purely neural systems.
This paper makes six contributions: (1) formal definitions of NeSy Attack Surface, Symbolic Integrity Violation (SIV), and Cross-Layer Amplification Ratio \mathcal{X}, decomposed into neural-caused and autonomous symbolic sensitivity components; (2) a unified threat model extending MITRE ATLAS with 11 NeSy-specific tactic extensions and a five-profile attacker taxonomy; (3) a symbolic-layer threat catalogue covering knowledge graph (KG) poisoning, ontology-merging, and inference-engine subversion; (4) analysis of cognitive risks -- automation bias, authority bias, and sycophantic reinforcement -- structurally amplified by NeSy's explicit logical explanations relative to black-box neural outputs; (5) interdisciplinary mitigations with measurable acceptance criteria aligned to NIST AI 600-1 and the EU AI Act; (6) three empirical benchmarks: (E1) targeted KG poisoning achieves break-even SIV at injection budget B=5 on a 205-entity medical KG, with a KG-specific stealth/SIV trade-off; (E2) PGD-10 at \varepsilon=0.01 yields \mathcal{X}=5.884 (95% CI [4.64,\, 8.00], p<0.0001), confirmed adversarially specific by a matched-random baseline (E^{R}_{\mathrm{rand}}=0), on a DistilBERT+ProbLog pipeline; (E3) single-axiom OWL edits achieve 93.3% SIV success with 100% Pellet-consistency stealth, but held-out STIX detection fails at 50% (random-guessing level), an open problem.
Comments: 28 pages, 1 figure, 10 tables
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
ACM classes: I.2.6; I.2.3; K.6.5
Report number: V202606
Cite as: arXiv:2606.17223 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.17223v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.17223
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Submission history
From: Manojkumar Parmar [view email]
[v1] Mon, 15 Jun 2026 19:11:55 UTC (233 KB)
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