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Forced Deferral: Manipulating Routing Decisions in Multimodal LLM Cascades

arXiv AI Archived Jun 16, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.15308v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown strong visual reasoning abilities, serving a large model for every query is computationally expensive. MLLM cascades mitigate this cost by first querying a weak but cheaper model and deferring to a strong model when the weak model's output is unconfident. However, since the weak model's confidence directly controls compute allocation, these systems expose a new attack surface: an adversary c

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    Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence [Submitted on 13 Jun 2026] Forced Deferral: Manipulating Routing Decisions in Multimodal LLM Cascades Zhongye Liu, Yaopei Zeng, Yurui Chang, Lu Lin While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown strong visual reasoning abilities, serving a large model for every query is computationally expensive. MLLM cascades mitigate this cost by first querying a weak but cheaper model and deferring to a strong model when the weak model's output is unconfident. However, since the weak model's confidence directly controls compute allocation, these systems expose a new attack surface: an adversary can manipulate confidence so that their queries are consistently deferred to the strong model. Motivated by this vulnerability, we introduce the Forced Deferral Attack (FDA), an adversarial image attack that lowers the weak model's confidence and causes cascades to route queries to the strong model. FDA learns a universal border trigger by optimizing a temperature-flattened objective. This objective pushes the weak model's token distribution on triggered inputs toward less concentrated targets constructed from its clean responses. Across datasets, model families, and deferral metrics, FDA consistently increases strong-model routing while outperforming image-perturbation and prompt-injection baselines. These results show that MLLM cascades are vulnerable to attacks that manipulate compute allocation, forcing unintended strong-model usage without directly targeting answer correctness. Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2606.15308 [cs.AI]   (or arXiv:2606.15308v1 [cs.AI] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.15308 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Zhongye Liu [view email] [v1] Sat, 13 Jun 2026 13:53:11 UTC (4,176 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.AI < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv AI
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 16, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 16, 2026
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