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FuseChain: Runtime Evidence Reconstruction for Software Supply-Chain Attacks

arXiv Security Archived Jun 16, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.15811v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Software supply-chain (SSC) attacks are increasingly multi-stage, cross-source, and temporally distributed. A single attack campaign may leave weak and fragmented traces across multi-source telemetry that captures different granularities and perspectives of runtime behavior. Existing runtime detection systems often analyze these sources independently, making it difficult to identify low-frequency attack evidence or reconstruct the temporal context

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 14 Jun 2026] FuseChain: Runtime Evidence Reconstruction for Software Supply-Chain Attacks Zhuoran Tan, Yutian Tang, Jeremy Singer, Christos Anagnostopoulos, Ke Xiao Software supply-chain (SSC) attacks are increasingly multi-stage, cross-source, and temporally distributed. A single attack campaign may leave weak and fragmented traces across multi-source telemetry that captures different granularities and perspectives of runtime behavior. Existing runtime detection systems often analyze these sources independently, making it difficult to identify low-frequency attack evidence or reconstruct the temporal context in which it appears. We present FUSECHAIN, a runtime detection framework that represents multi-source software supply-chain telemetry as a temporal heterogeneous provenance graph over a unified event-time axis. By aligning package/runtime traces, process events, network telemetry, DNS/HTTP metadata, and security alerts on a unified temporal graph, FuseChain captures cross-source dependencies and sparse attack evidence that may be ambiguous within any individual source. It learns anomaly-centric temporal representations from benign-prefix telemetry and performs deployable attack-stage reconstruction through a lightweight decoder on top of a frozen anomaly backbone. Our experiments show that jointly optimizing anomaly detection and stage prediction is ineffective under sparse and imbalanced runtime supply-chain telemetry. Across seven SSC attack scenarios, FuseChain improves deployable stage reconstruction from 0.369 to 0.881 Stage Recall@500 with a frozen-backbone decoder, while adaptive retrieval further increases observable-stage recall from 0.524 to 0.655 without modifying the detector. These results highlight the deployable value of decoupling runtime SSC anomaly detection from downstream attack-stage interpretation. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.15811 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.15811v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.15811 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Zhuoran Tan [view email] [v1] Sun, 14 Jun 2026 13:24:00 UTC (1,489 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 16, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 16, 2026
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