Censorship-Resistant Sealed-Bid Auctions on Blockchains
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 16, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.14939v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Auctions are now central to blockchain markets, settling NFT sales, token launches, DeFi liquidations, and arbitrage opportunities. Each on-chain bid is a public transaction whose inclusion is decided by a single consensus proposer per block. The proposer can observe pending bids, exclude competitors, and submit bids of their own, breaking the fairness guarantees of classical sealed-bid auctions. To enable latency-sensitive sealed-bid auctions in b
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 12 Jun 2026]
Censorship-Resistant Sealed-Bid Auctions on Blockchains
Orestis Alpos, Lioba Heimbach, Kartik Nayak, Sarisht Wadhwa
Auctions are now central to blockchain markets, settling NFT sales, token launches, DeFi liquidations, and arbitrage opportunities. Each on-chain bid is a public transaction whose inclusion is decided by a single consensus proposer per block. The proposer can observe pending bids, exclude competitors, and submit bids of their own, breaking the fairness guarantees of classical sealed-bid auctions.
To enable latency-sensitive sealed-bid auctions in blockchain settings, we formalize four properties -- each necessary to prevent a concrete attack -- and design a protocol achieving all four: hiding bid contents, existence, and bidder identity until reveal (Hiding); counting all timely honest bids and rejecting late adversarial bids (Simultaneous Release); preventing silent withdrawal of committed bids (No Free Bid Withdrawal); and charging on-chain fees only to winners (Auction Participation Efficiency).
Our protocol uses a timestamping oracle (instantiated with a committee of 2f_ts+1 timestampers) and a censorship-resistant inclusion predicate (instantiated using a FOCIL-based inclusion list), with only the winning bid settled on-chain. Our construction relies on two zero-knowledge proofs: an eligibility proof that anonymously proves deposit membership to the timestamping committee, and an auction proof that binds a bid to a specific auction for the inclusion list committee. We implement both using Groth16 over BN254 with Poseidon hashing in arkworks/Rust: the auction proof generates in 13 ms and verifies in under 1 ms; eligibility proofs for Merkle trees up to 2^32 bidders generate in 47-159 ms and verify in about 1 ms.
Together, this yields a sealed-bid auction primitive practical for high-value, time-sensitive blockchain settings.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.14939 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.14939v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.14939
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Submission history
From: Lioba Heimbach [view email]
[v1] Fri, 12 Jun 2026 20:24:51 UTC (247 KB)
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