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Pseudonym Scheme Based on Hybrid Certificates for Security Credential Management System in Vehicular Communications

arXiv Security Archived Jun 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.14008v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In recent years, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) have developed a series of security communication standards for vehicular communications. These standards include mechanisms such as the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Butterfly Key Expansion (BKE) to protect vehicle privacy. However, these standards are mainly based on the Elliptic-Curve Cry

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 12 Jun 2026] Pseudonym Scheme Based on Hybrid Certificates for Security Credential Management System in Vehicular Communications Abel C. H. Chen, F. J. Hwang, Yu-Chih Wei, Chin-Chen Chang, Bon-Yeh Lin In recent years, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) have developed a series of security communication standards for vehicular communications. These standards include mechanisms such as the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) and Butterfly Key Expansion (BKE) to protect vehicle privacy. However, these standards are mainly based on the Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), which may be vulnerable to attacks from quantum computing in the future. In response to this potential risk, this study proposes a hybrid certificate that combines the ECC with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This approach enables infrastructure systems to be built on cryptographic foundations that are more resilient to quantum-based attacks. Furthermore, this study presents a generalized pseudonym scheme that is compatible with various cryptographic algorithms for generating pseudonym certificates. This design aims to eliminate the possibility of inferring any correlation between the public key in a pseudonym certificate and that in an enrollment certificate. This study also conducts a comprehensive performance evaluation of the RSA, ECC, and PQC algorithms, particularly those standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The comparison considers factors such as message length and computation time. Based on the findings, this study recommends suitable pseudonym schemes that adopt hybrid certificates for secure and efficient use in vehicular communications. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI); Performance (cs.PF); Systems and Control (eess.SY) Cite as: arXiv:2606.14008 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.14008v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.14008 Focus to learn more Journal reference: IEEE Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering (2026) Related DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ICJECE.2026.3692881 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Abel C. H. Chen [view email] [v1] Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:59:42 UTC (785 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.NI cs.PF cs.SY eess eess.SY References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 15, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 15, 2026
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