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The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements

arXiv AI Archived Jun 12, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.12797v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising. We ask whether the frameworks used to build these systems provide architectural-level structural safety guarantees. Applying six containment principles derived from a compositional model of agentic ar

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    Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence [Submitted on 11 Jun 2026] The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements Md Jafrin Hossain, Mohammad Arif Hossain, Weiqi Liu, Nirwan Ansari Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising. We ask whether the frameworks used to build these systems provide architectural-level structural safety guarantees. Applying six containment principles derived from a compositional model of agentic architectures, we audit three dominant frameworks (LangChain, AutoGPT, and OpenAI Agents SDK) and find no native compliance in any of them. Memory integrity, a defense against one of the most prevalent vulnerability classes, is not observed in any of the three evaluated frameworks. We validate these findings empirically: in a simulated government benefits agent built on LangChain, a single memory-poisoning write induces persistent targeted corruption across all tested seeds and backends, increasing the wrongful denial rate for targeted applicants to 88.9%. Under a complex five-factor policy, the same attack preserves aggregate accuracy while increasing targeted wrongful denials by 3.5x, rendering the corruption difficult to detect through standard monitoring. We then introduce two lightweight containment mechanisms: a memory integrity validator and a policy gate, which eliminate both attack vectors with sub-millisecond overhead (<0.2ms per call). We conclude that the current agentic framework ecosystem may not yet meet secure-by-default expectations for public-facing deployments and outline priority architectural interventions to enable trustworthy deployment in high-stakes, socially impactful applications. Comments: ICML 2026 (AI4GOOD Workshop) Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2606.12797 [cs.AI]   (or arXiv:2606.12797v1 [cs.AI] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.12797 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Mohammad Arif Hossain [view email] [v1] Thu, 11 Jun 2026 01:46:26 UTC (627 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.AI < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv AI
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 12, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 12, 2026
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