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Beyond Attack Success Rate: Examining Trigger Leakage in Vision-Language Agentic Systems

arXiv Security Archived Jun 12, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.12586v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Vision-Language Agentic Systems (VLAS) connect visual perception to planning, tool use, and physical actions. This means backdoor-type triggers can propagate through both decision pipelines and their connected interfaces, thus making visual backdoors a system-level threat. Current evaluations on such backdoors focus on clean accuracy and attack success rate (ASR), metrics that capture whether a trigger works, but not whether an attack is actually "

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 10 Jun 2026] Beyond Attack Success Rate: Examining Trigger Leakage in Vision-Language Agentic Systems Jiamin Chang, Salil Kanhere, Piotr Koniusz, Jason (Minhui)Xue, Hammond Pearce Vision-Language Agentic Systems (VLAS) connect visual perception to planning, tool use, and physical actions. This means backdoor-type triggers can propagate through both decision pipelines and their connected interfaces, thus making visual backdoors a system-level threat. Current evaluations on such backdoors focus on clean accuracy and attack success rate (ASR), metrics that capture whether a trigger works, but not whether an attack is actually "precise" -- i.e. whether it triggers hidden behaviors only when intended. In this work, we formalize the failure of trigger precision as "trigger leakage": inputs that are visually or semantically close to the intended trigger and therefore inadvertently activate the attacker-specified behavior. To quantify this leakage, we introduce Neighbor Leakage Rate (NLR). Our experiments show that at a 3% poisoning ratio, icon and text triggers remain robust to common visual transformations, but their neighboring variants leak heavily, with NLR reaching 0.996 (icon) and 0.944 (text). Using textual triggers as a controlled probe, we show that standard fine-tuning learns a broad activation region rather than an exact trigger condition, causing neighboring strings to invoke the malicious behavior even when the exact trigger is absent. Adding edit-distance-one hard-negative samples during training substantially narrows this activation region and reduces leakage, including in image-editing and embodied-manipulation workflows, where leaked triggers can propagate into executable programs and action sequences. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.12586 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.12586v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.12586 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jiamin Chang [view email] [v1] Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:33:52 UTC (5,628 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 12, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 12, 2026
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