From Parameters to Feature Space: Task Arithmetic for Backdoor Mitigation in Model Merging
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 12, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.12498v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model merging (MM) has gained significant attention as a cost-effective approach to integrate multiple task-specific models into a unified model. However, recent work reveals that MM is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Existing defenses based on task arithmetic often fail to eliminate backdoors without substantially degrading clean-task performance, owing to their reliance on direct parameter-space editing. To address this gap, we propose Li
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 10 Jun 2026]
From Parameters to Feature Space: Task Arithmetic for Backdoor Mitigation in Model Merging
Zhenqian Zhu, Yamin Hu, Yiya Diao, Weixiang Li, Haodong Li, Wenjian Luo
Model merging (MM) has gained significant attention as a cost-effective approach to integrate multiple task-specific models into a unified model. However, recent work reveals that MM is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Existing defenses based on task arithmetic often fail to eliminate backdoors without substantially degrading clean-task performance, owing to their reliance on direct parameter-space editing. To address this gap, we propose Linear Feature Path Minimization (LFPM), a backdoor mitigation framework for model merging, which introduces an anti-backdoor task vector into the backdoored merged model. Unlike prior approaches, LFPM formulates the backdoor robustness of the merged model from a unified feature-space perspective under the Cross-Task Linearity (CTL) framework, which leverages the approximate linearity of features across tasks. This perspective guides the optimization of the anti-backdoor task to suppress backdoors while preserving clean-task performance. Furthermore, we introduce an effective optimization mechanism based on gradient accumulation and loss path-integral, ensuring robust backdoor suppression along the interpolation path. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LFPM consistently exhibits strong robustness against backdoor attacks in both full fine-tuning and Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (PEFT) settings.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.12498 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.12498v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.12498
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From: Zhenqian Zhu [view email]
[v1] Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:51:36 UTC (1,425 KB)
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