Systematic Cybersecurity Risk Analysis of European Rail Traffic Management System
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 11, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.11839v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is a widely adopted standard unifying train management in the EU. While the standard allows for use cases like fully autonomous driving, cybersecurity has been an afterthought. Risk analysis enables the systematic assessment and prioritization of threats and mitigations. To date, it remains unclear which threats are most significant in ERTMS. This study systematically models components of ERTMS and an
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 10 Jun 2026]
Systematic Cybersecurity Risk Analysis of European Rail Traffic Management System
Kacper Darowski, Sebastian N. Peters, Lukas Lautenschlager
European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is a widely adopted standard unifying train management in the EU. While the standard allows for use cases like fully autonomous driving, cybersecurity has been an afterthought. Risk analysis enables the systematic assessment and prioritization of threats and mitigations. To date, it remains unclear which threats are most significant in ERTMS. This study systematically models components of ERTMS and analyzes their security in light of threats identified in the underlying technologies. The results suggest a concerning state of ERTMS, despite its critical role in railway safety. The use of legacy standards like EuroBalises and GSM-Railway (GSM-R) introduces vulnerabilities that persist across minimal ERTMS implementations, deployments incorporating various optional safety measures, and prospective future evolutions of the system, e.g., adopting Future Railway Mobile Communication System (FRMCS). Fully transitioning to European Train Control System (ETCS) level 2 was identified as the most significant measure for advancing ERTMS cybersecurity. The results indicate that a shift of ERTMS toward security is required to ensure availability and safe operation. While the chosen methodology proved its feasibility and shows remaining weaknesses of ERTMS, future work is needed to develop railway-centric adaptations to improve the quantification and evaluation of the computed risks.
Comments: Extended version of the paper accepted at ARES 2026 CPRA. First three authors contributed equally to this work
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.11839 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.11839v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.11839
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Submission history
From: Sebastian N. Peters [view email]
[v1] Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:18:19 UTC (29 KB)
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