Sovereign Assurance Boundary: Certificate-Bound Admission for Agentic Infrastructure
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 11, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.11632v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic infrastructure introduces a critical control-plane authorization problem: non-deterministic reasoning systems can propose high-stakes mutations to production resources, yet existing security mechanisms -- such as identity and access management (IAM), policy engines, consensus protocols, and audit logs -- either enforce static, context-unaware permissions or merely record actions post-execution. This paper introduces the Sovereign Assurance
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 10 Jun 2026]
Sovereign Assurance Boundary: Certificate-Bound Admission for Agentic Infrastructure
Jun He, Deying Yu
Agentic infrastructure introduces a critical control-plane authorization problem: non-deterministic reasoning systems can propose high-stakes mutations to production resources, yet existing security mechanisms -- such as identity and access management (IAM), policy engines, consensus protocols, and audit logs -- either enforce static, context-unaware permissions or merely record actions post-execution. This paper introduces the Sovereign Assurance Boundary (SAB), a certificate-bound runtime admission layer for autonomous execution authority. SAB intercepts agent proposals at an assurance airlock, compiles them into typed execution contracts C, and binds these contracts to cryptographic evidence digests H(E) and policy versions. The contracts are then routed through consequence-aware certification paths. Upon successful admission, the system emits a signed Sovereign Assurance Certificate (\Omega) that is strictly scoped to a specific execution identity, revocation epoch, and validity window. Finally, a sovereign execution broker verifies \Omega and performs fresh pre-execution revocation and drift checks before invoking infrastructure APIs. We detail the airlock-broker architecture, formalize its admission and revocation invariants, and report preliminary feasibility measurements from a Go prototype evaluated over 2,500 admission attempts. Ultimately, this broker-enforced model prevents autonomous reasoning from directly mutating state, transforming delegated execution authority into a cryptographically verifiable, evidence-bound, revocable, and replayable runtime artifact.
Comments: 12 pages, 1 figure, 13 tables
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.11632 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.11632v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.11632
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Submission history
From: Jun He [view email]
[v1] Wed, 10 Jun 2026 03:49:57 UTC (29 KB)
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