AI Code Sandboxes: A Comparative Security Study. Part 1 of 2 -- Engine-Level Properties (Attack Surface, Leakage, Stackability, CVE History, Patch Cadence, Fuzzing)
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arXiv:2606.08433v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper reads six engine-level measurements together -- 1.1 host attack surface, 1.2 information leakage, 1.3 defense-in-depth stackability, 1.4 public CVE history, 1.5 patch cadence, and 1.6 upstream fuzzing posture -- to describe how five AI-sandbox products isolate guest code from the host kernel. No single axis is a sufficient basis for a comparative judgement; the cross-axis reading is the load-bearing analysis. Three high-level findings: (
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 Jun 2026]
AI Code Sandboxes: A Comparative Security Study. Part 1 of 2 -- Engine-Level Properties (Attack Surface, Leakage, Stackability, CVE History, Patch Cadence, Fuzzing)
George Andronchik, Pavel Lokhmakov
This paper reads six engine-level measurements together -- 1.1 host attack surface, 1.2 information leakage, 1.3 defense-in-depth stackability, 1.4 public CVE history, 1.5 patch cadence, and 1.6 upstream fuzzing posture -- to describe how five AI-sandbox products isolate guest code from the host kernel. No single axis is a sufficient basis for a comparative judgement; the cross-axis reading is the load-bearing analysis.
Three high-level findings: (1) engine classes (microVM, userspace kernel, OCI container) separate cleanly on every architectural axis, but products within a class do not; (2) product pin policy is the dominant operator-facing variable -- engine-side patch latency aggregates to ~0 days for coordinated disclosures, while downstream lag spans 0 days to 471+ days to "opaque" to infinity; (3) fuzzing investment splits into three tiers, and the strongest combination -- microVM x continuous public fuzzer -- is unoccupied in this set, leaving the "0 published CVEs x no upstream fuzzer x no academic study" intersection structurally unmeasured.
We report per-axis orderings, per-product portraits, and a threat-model qualification matrix; no overall ranking is proposed. Companion repository (code, Apache-2.0): this https URL. License: CC BY 4.0.
Comments: 61 pages, 7 figures, 33 tables; Part 1 of 2; companion code repository (Apache-2.0): this https URL
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
ACM classes: D.4.6; K.6.5; C.2.0
Cite as: arXiv:2606.08433 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.08433v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.08433
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Submission history
From: George Andronchik Mr [view email]
[v1] Sun, 7 Jun 2026 03:20:03 UTC (418 KB)
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