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AI Code Sandboxes: A Comparative Security Study. Part 1 of 2 -- Engine-Level Properties (Attack Surface, Leakage, Stackability, CVE History, Patch Cadence, Fuzzing)

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arXiv:2606.08433v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper reads six engine-level measurements together -- 1.1 host attack surface, 1.2 information leakage, 1.3 defense-in-depth stackability, 1.4 public CVE history, 1.5 patch cadence, and 1.6 upstream fuzzing posture -- to describe how five AI-sandbox products isolate guest code from the host kernel. No single axis is a sufficient basis for a comparative judgement; the cross-axis reading is the load-bearing analysis. Three high-level findings: (

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 7 Jun 2026] AI Code Sandboxes: A Comparative Security Study. Part 1 of 2 -- Engine-Level Properties (Attack Surface, Leakage, Stackability, CVE History, Patch Cadence, Fuzzing) George Andronchik, Pavel Lokhmakov This paper reads six engine-level measurements together -- 1.1 host attack surface, 1.2 information leakage, 1.3 defense-in-depth stackability, 1.4 public CVE history, 1.5 patch cadence, and 1.6 upstream fuzzing posture -- to describe how five AI-sandbox products isolate guest code from the host kernel. No single axis is a sufficient basis for a comparative judgement; the cross-axis reading is the load-bearing analysis. Three high-level findings: (1) engine classes (microVM, userspace kernel, OCI container) separate cleanly on every architectural axis, but products within a class do not; (2) product pin policy is the dominant operator-facing variable -- engine-side patch latency aggregates to ~0 days for coordinated disclosures, while downstream lag spans 0 days to 471+ days to "opaque" to infinity; (3) fuzzing investment splits into three tiers, and the strongest combination -- microVM x continuous public fuzzer -- is unoccupied in this set, leaving the "0 published CVEs x no upstream fuzzer x no academic study" intersection structurally unmeasured. We report per-axis orderings, per-product portraits, and a threat-model qualification matrix; no overall ranking is proposed. Companion repository (code, Apache-2.0): this https URL. License: CC BY 4.0. Comments: 61 pages, 7 figures, 33 tables; Part 1 of 2; companion code repository (Apache-2.0): this https URL Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) ACM classes: D.4.6; K.6.5; C.2.0 Cite as: arXiv:2606.08433 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.08433v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.08433 Focus to learn more Submission history From: George Andronchik Mr [view email] [v1] Sun, 7 Jun 2026 03:20:03 UTC (418 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 09, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 09, 2026
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