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Quantifying and Defending against the Privacy Risk in Logit-based Federated Learning

arXiv Security Archived Jun 09, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.08252v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Federated learning aims to protect data privacy by collaboratively learning a model without sharing private data among clients. Unlike traditional parameter-based FL methods that exchange model weights or gradients during training, emerging logit-based FL approaches share model outputs (logits) on public data. This strategy promotes model heterogeneity, reduces communication overhead, and enhances clients' privacy. However, the potential privacy ri

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 6 Jun 2026] Quantifying and Defending against the Privacy Risk in Logit-based Federated Learning Sheng Wan, Dashan Gao, Hanlin Gu, Lixin Fan, Daning Hu, Qiang Yang Federated learning aims to protect data privacy by collaboratively learning a model without sharing private data among clients. Unlike traditional parameter-based FL methods that exchange model weights or gradients during training, emerging logit-based FL approaches share model outputs (logits) on public data. This strategy promotes model heterogeneity, reduces communication overhead, and enhances clients' privacy. However, the potential privacy risks associated with these logit-based methods have been largely overlooked. This research presents the first theoretical and empirical analysis of a hidden privacy risk in logit-based FL methods - the risk that a semi-honest server (adversary) may learn clients' private models from logits. To quantify and address this threat, we develop the Adaptive Model Stealing Attack (AdaMSA) by leveraging historical logits during training. Notably, we observe that this inherent privacy risk persists even when public data is unrelated to private data, emphasizing the urgency to address privacy vulnerabilities in logit-based FL methods. Moreover, our theoretical analysis establishes the bounds of this privacy risk. We then propose a simple but effective defense strategy that perturbs the transmitted logits in the direction that minimizes the privacy risk while maximally preserving the training performance. The experimental results validate our analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of AdaMSA and our defense strategy. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC) Cite as: arXiv:2606.08252 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.08252v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.08252 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Sheng Wan [view email] [v1] Sat, 6 Jun 2026 16:40:53 UTC (830 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.DC References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 09, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 09, 2026
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