Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety
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arXiv:2606.06529v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: An attacker that strategically chooses when to attack is much harder to catch than one that attacks indiscriminately. AI control is a safety framework for deploying capable but untrusted AI agents under the oversight of a weaker, trusted monitor and a limited human audit budget. Control evaluations stress-test these protocols by pitting a red-team attack policy against the blue-team monitor, but current evaluations typically assume attackers that d
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 3 Jun 2026]
Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety
Catherine Ge-Wang, Tyler Crosse, Benjamin Hadad IV, Joachim Schaeffer, Ram Potham, Tyler Tracy
An attacker that strategically chooses when to attack is much harder to catch than one that attacks indiscriminately. AI control is a safety framework for deploying capable but untrusted AI agents under the oversight of a weaker, trusted monitor and a limited human audit budget. Control evaluations stress-test these protocols by pitting a red-team attack policy against the blue-team monitor, but current evaluations typically assume attackers that do not strategically select when to attack. We study this capability, attack selection, in agentic settings by decomposing attack decisions into a start policy, which decides when an attacker should attack, and a stop policy, which decides when an attacker should abort an ongoing attack. Across two agentic settings, BashArena and LinuxArena, both policies substantially lower measured empirical safety without changing the underlying attack capability. At a 1% audit budget, our start policy reduces safety by 20pp on both BashArena and LinuxArena, and our stop policy reduces safety by 20pp on BashArena and 28pp on LinuxArena. These reductions should be interpreted as upper bounds on the effect of attack selection. Existing control evaluations may therefore yield overly optimistic safety estimates against selective attackers. We recommend that future evaluations, system cards, and safety cases elicit attack selection to produce more realistic safety estimates.
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.06529 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2606.06529v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.06529
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From: Tyler Crosse [view email]
[v1] Wed, 3 Jun 2026 11:04:59 UTC (5,255 KB)
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