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Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety

arXiv AI Archived Jun 08, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.06529v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: An attacker that strategically chooses when to attack is much harder to catch than one that attacks indiscriminately. AI control is a safety framework for deploying capable but untrusted AI agents under the oversight of a weaker, trusted monitor and a limited human audit budget. Control evaluations stress-test these protocols by pitting a red-team attack policy against the blue-team monitor, but current evaluations typically assume attackers that d

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    Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence [Submitted on 3 Jun 2026] Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety Catherine Ge-Wang, Tyler Crosse, Benjamin Hadad IV, Joachim Schaeffer, Ram Potham, Tyler Tracy An attacker that strategically chooses when to attack is much harder to catch than one that attacks indiscriminately. AI control is a safety framework for deploying capable but untrusted AI agents under the oversight of a weaker, trusted monitor and a limited human audit budget. Control evaluations stress-test these protocols by pitting a red-team attack policy against the blue-team monitor, but current evaluations typically assume attackers that do not strategically select when to attack. We study this capability, attack selection, in agentic settings by decomposing attack decisions into a start policy, which decides when an attacker should attack, and a stop policy, which decides when an attacker should abort an ongoing attack. Across two agentic settings, BashArena and LinuxArena, both policies substantially lower measured empirical safety without changing the underlying attack capability. At a 1% audit budget, our start policy reduces safety by 20pp on both BashArena and LinuxArena, and our stop policy reduces safety by 20pp on BashArena and 28pp on LinuxArena. These reductions should be interpreted as upper bounds on the effect of attack selection. Existing control evaluations may therefore yield overly optimistic safety estimates against selective attackers. We recommend that future evaluations, system cards, and safety cases elicit attack selection to produce more realistic safety estimates. Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2606.06529 [cs.AI]   (or arXiv:2606.06529v1 [cs.AI] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.06529 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Tyler Crosse [view email] [v1] Wed, 3 Jun 2026 11:04:59 UTC (5,255 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.AI < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv AI
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 08, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 08, 2026
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