Protecting K-Nearest Neighbor Queries from Location Inference Attacks
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 05, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.05648v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The k-nearest neighbor query (kNNQ) is a core component of modern location-based services (LBS) and has been widely adopted in popular features such as ``people nearby''. However, its potential privacy risks have long been overlooked. In this work, we present the first two attacks against kNNQ, namely the geometric intersection location inference attack (GI-LIA) and the zero-order optimization location inference attack (ZO-LIA), revealing the inher
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 4 Jun 2026]
Protecting K-Nearest Neighbor Queries from Location Inference Attacks
Zhiyu Sun, Jie Fu, Xinpeng Ling, Huifa Li, Zhili Chen
The k-nearest neighbor query (kNNQ) is a core component of modern location-based services (LBS) and has been widely adopted in popular features such as ``people nearby''. However, its potential privacy risks have long been overlooked. In this work, we present the first two attacks against kNNQ, namely the geometric intersection location inference attack (GI-LIA) and the zero-order optimization location inference attack (ZO-LIA), revealing the inherent location privacy risks posed by kNNQ. To mitigate these privacy risks, we further propose DPRS, a differential privacy framework for kNNQ protection. The core idea of DPRS is to incorporate a rejection sampling mechanism within a constrained perturbation interval, thereby mitigating the distance distortion caused by excessive noise injection. In addition, we design a private interval construction algorithm to construct the perturbation interval, enabling the rejection sampling mechanism to achieve a more favorable trade-off between privacy protection and query utility in kNNQ. Extensive experiments on real-world spatial datasets demonstrate that DPRS outperforms existing methods in both privacy protection and query utility. Our code is available at this https URL.
Comments: This paper has been accepted by ECML-PKDD 2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.05648 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.05648v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.05648
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From: Zhiyu Sun [view email]
[v1] Thu, 4 Jun 2026 03:25:58 UTC (366 KB)
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