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Search-Time Contamination in Deep Research Agents: Measuring Performance Inflation in Public Benchmark Evaluation

arXiv Security Archived Jun 05, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.05241v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Public benchmarks enable fair and reproducible evaluation of LLM reasoning, but they become fragile for deep research agents that actively search the web during inference. Such agents may retrieve public benchmark metadata, question context, or even ground-truth answers via web search. This gives rise to Search-Time Contamination (STC), where external retrieval bypasses intended reasoning and inflates measured performance. We systematically study S

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 3 Jun 2026] Search-Time Contamination in Deep Research Agents: Measuring Performance Inflation in Public Benchmark Evaluation Yongjie Wang, Xinyue Zhang, Kunhong Yao, Zhiwei Zeng, Kaisong Song, Jun Lin, Zhiqi Shen Public benchmarks enable fair and reproducible evaluation of LLM reasoning, but they become fragile for deep research agents that actively search the web during inference. Such agents may retrieve public benchmark metadata, question context, or even ground-truth answers via web search. This gives rise to Search-Time Contamination (STC), where external retrieval bypasses intended reasoning and inflates measured performance. We systematically study STC in deep research agent evaluation. We define three contamination types with increasing severity, namely Benchmark Metadata Leakage, Question-Context Leakage, and Explicit Answer Leakage, and develop detection algorithms to identify them and quantify their impact on agent performance. Evaluating modern deep research agents on six public benchmarks, we find that STC is widespread and can inflate performance by up to 4%. Our findings show that existing evaluations may overestimate true reasoning ability. We therefore advocate contamination-aware practices, including isolated sandboxes, transparent search trajectories, and controlled benchmark access. Comments: Under Review Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) MSC classes: 68T50 ACM classes: I.2.7 Cite as: arXiv:2606.05241 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.05241v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.05241 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yongjie Wang [view email] [v1] Wed, 3 Jun 2026 07:11:36 UTC (516 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 05, 2026
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    Jun 05, 2026
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