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Description-Code Inconsistency in Real-world MCP Servers: Measurement, Detection, and Security Implications

arXiv Security Archived Jun 04, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.04769v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a critical standard empowering Large Language Models (LLMs) to utilize external tools. In this ecosystem, LLMs rely on natural language descriptions provided by MCP servers to select and execute functions. This interaction implicitly assumes that tool descriptions faithfully reflect their underlying implementations, while this assumption is not mandatorily verified in practice. As a result, MCP deploy

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 3 Jun 2026] Description-Code Inconsistency in Real-world MCP Servers: Measurement, Detection, and Security Implications Yutao Shi, Xiaohan Zhang, Xiangjing Zhang, Xihua Shen, Hui Ouyang, Huming Qiu, Mi Zhang, Min Yang The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a critical standard empowering Large Language Models (LLMs) to utilize external tools. In this ecosystem, LLMs rely on natural language descriptions provided by MCP servers to select and execute functions. This interaction implicitly assumes that tool descriptions faithfully reflect their underlying implementations, while this assumption is not mandatorily verified in practice. As a result, MCP deployments may suffer from a problem named Description-Code Inconsistency (DCI), where a tool's description of its capabilities and security boundaries is not consistent with what the code actually does. In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of DCI in real-world MCP servers. We formally define the problem and propose a comprehensive taxonomy spanning functionality inconsistencies and undeclared side effects. Guided by this taxonomy, we develop DCIChecker, an automated framework that combines structure-aware static analysis with the Direct-Reverse-Arbitration prompting method to cross-validate tool descriptions against actual code implementations. We apply this framework to a large-scale dataset comprising 19,200 description-code pairs extracted from 2,214 real-world MCP servers. Our measurement reveals that DCI is widespread, with 9.93% of these pairs exhibiting inconsistencies. We further demonstrate that DCI creates a critical defense blind spot, facilitating varied risks from operational failures to stealthy malicious behaviors. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies to enforce semantic consistency and enhance the reliability of the emerging agentic ecosystem. Comments: Preprint Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Software Engineering (cs.SE) Cite as: arXiv:2606.04769 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.04769v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.04769 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yutao Shi [view email] [v1] Wed, 3 Jun 2026 11:51:32 UTC (559 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.SE References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 04, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 04, 2026
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