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Notarized Agents: Receiver-Attested Confidential Receipts for AI Agent Actions

arXiv Security Archived Jun 04, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.04193v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Current AI agent observability is structurally compromised: the entity producing the activity log is the same entity whose activity is being logged. A compromised or buggy agent can omit, alter, or fabricate its own traces, and the operator running the agent has no independent way to detect tampering. We propose a class of protocols that resolves this by inverting the trust boundary: the service that receives an agent's call signs a receipt of what

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 2 Jun 2026] Notarized Agents: Receiver-Attested Confidential Receipts for AI Agent Actions Juan Figuera Current AI agent observability is structurally compromised: the entity producing the activity log is the same entity whose activity is being logged. A compromised or buggy agent can omit, alter, or fabricate its own traces, and the operator running the agent has no independent way to detect tampering. We propose a class of protocols that resolves this by inverting the trust boundary: the service that receives an agent's call signs a receipt of what it observed using its own key, encrypts the receipt to the agent's owner, and publishes it to a public transparency log. The owner reconstructs a tamper-evident trail without trusting the agent or its operator. We instantiate the class as Sello, a protocol combining four properties absent in any current system: (P1) receiver-side signing, (P2) HPKE encryption to an owner public key bound to the authorization token via JWS, (P3) publication to a witness-cosigned Merkle log, and (P4) owner-side discovery by token reference. We describe the protocol, analyze its security under an adversary that controls the agent and its operator, present microbenchmarks of the cryptographic operations, and situate Sello among adjacent receipt-protocol work (Signet, AgentROA, Agent Passport System, draft-farley-acta, SCITT). We discuss known limitations including the suppression attack, service collusion, and the adoption-incentive problem. Comments: 22 pages. Reference implementation at this https URL Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC) Cite as: arXiv:2606.04193 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.04193v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.04193 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Juan Figuera [view email] [v1] Tue, 2 Jun 2026 20:21:58 UTC (25 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.DC References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 04, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 04, 2026
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