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MimeLens: Position-Agnostic Content-Type Detection for Binary Fragments

arXiv Security Archived Jun 04, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.04171v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: File-type classification underlies many workflows like malware triage, forensic carving, packet inspection, and storage indexing. Learned systems such as Google's Magika assume whole-file access at a known offset, so they break on the inputs many of these tasks actually produce, like a single packet payload, a header-less carved fragment, a random disk block, or a chunked upload. We introduce MimeLens, a family of small BERT-style encoders pretrain

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 2 Jun 2026] MimeLens: Position-Agnostic Content-Type Detection for Binary Fragments Michael J. Bommarito II File-type classification underlies many workflows like malware triage, forensic carving, packet inspection, and storage indexing. Learned systems such as Google's Magika assume whole-file access at a known offset, so they break on the inputs many of these tasks actually produce, like a single packet payload, a header-less carved fragment, a random disk block, or a chunked upload. We introduce MimeLens, a family of small BERT-style encoders pretrained on binary content from windows sampled at a uniformly random offset within each file, with no privileged head-of-file position, in standard- and short-context variants. A byte chunk goes in from anywhere in a file, no header needed and no fixed size; out comes one of libmagic's 125 MIME labels. On the clean head of complete files, MimeLens beats Magika v1.1 by +10.7 pp top-1 on libmagic-labeled data, and it keeps classifying where Magika cannot: from a single mid-stream UDP packet, and more than twice as accurately as libmagic and Magika on random mid-file disk blocks. The cost is latency: MimeLens runs roughly one to two orders of magnitude slower per sample on CPU than Magika, though it matches on consumer GPUs or in batch. All trained checkpoints are released on Hugging Face (mjbommar/mimelens-001-*). Comments: 18 pages, 2 figures, 15 tables. Models released on Hugging Face (this https URL reference training code at this https URL Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2606.04171 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.04171v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.04171 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Michael Bommarito [view email] [v1] Tue, 2 Jun 2026 19:35:44 UTC (76 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 04, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 04, 2026
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