Thinking Past the Answer: Evaluating Harmful Overthinking in Large Reasoning Models
arXiv AIArchived Jun 03, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.02835v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dyna
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 1 Jun 2026]
Thinking Past the Answer: Evaluating Harmful Overthinking in Large Reasoning Models
Simone Caldarella, Davide Talon, Rahaf Aljundi, Elisa Ricci, Massimiliano Mancini
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at this https URL.
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2606.02835 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2606.02835v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.02835
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From: Simone Caldarella [view email]
[v1] Mon, 1 Jun 2026 19:59:27 UTC (1,391 KB)
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