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Secure AltDA Integration for Ethereum L2s: An End-to-End Validation Framework

arXiv Security Archived Jun 03, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.03010v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Alternative data availability (AltDA) systems provide Ethereum L2s with an external data publication layer for high throughput rollup designs. By moving bulk data publication outside of Ethereum, AltDA allows L2s to process more data than native DA. However, this replacement introduces a new consensus critical integration layer. Existing ecosystem frameworks identify high level risks, such as external DA trust assumptions and the presence or absenc

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✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 2 Jun 2026] Secure AltDA Integration for Ethereum L2s: An End-to-End Validation Framework Bowen Xue, Samuel Laferriere Alternative data availability (AltDA) systems provide Ethereum L2s with an external data publication layer for high throughput rollup designs. By moving bulk data publication outside of Ethereum, AltDA allows L2s to process more data than native DA. However, this replacement introduces a new consensus critical integration layer. Existing ecosystem frameworks identify high level risks, such as external DA trust assumptions and the presence or absence of a DA verifier, but do not provide a complete specification for how an L2 should integrate with AltDA. This gap can lead to L2 halts, inconsistent derivation across honest L2 nodes, invalid state assertions, or bridge attacks. This paper presents a canonical validation framework for secure AltDA integration. We model the boundary as a typed, deterministic, and total translation from L1 inbox bytes to an AltDA commitment, then to externally available data, and finally to the rollup payload consumed by the rest of core L2s logic. The central principle is that every adversarial input must lead to a defined unique outcome. We show how missing obligations lead to concrete failure modes, including underconstrained settlement, derivation halts, inconsistent honest node behavior, invalid state assertions, and bridge safety failures. We then apply the framework to representative AltDA integration architectures, including Celestia-Blobstream, EigenDA based designs, and Avail-ZKsync. Our evaluation shows that secure AltDA integration is not determined solely by the DA provider or bridge. The surrounding L2 integration must also enforce the full validation relation connecting L1 inbox inputs to accepted L2 state. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2606.03010 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.03010v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.03010 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Bowen Xue [view email] [v1] Tue, 2 Jun 2026 01:31:03 UTC (129 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 03, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 03, 2026
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