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Patcher: Post-Hoc Patching of Backdoored Large Language Models

arXiv Security Archived Jun 03, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2606.02995v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison safety alignment data to embed hidden triggers that bypass safety mechanisms. Existing defenses often require comprehensive attack information or multiple triggered examples, making them impractical when defenders only observe a single reported failure case without knowing whether it stems from a backdoor attack or a natural alignment bug. This paper pre

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 2 Jun 2026] Patcher: Post-Hoc Patching of Backdoored Large Language Models Anjun Gao, Yueyang Quan, Yufei Xia, Zhuqing Liu, Minghong Fang Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison safety alignment data to embed hidden triggers that bypass safety mechanisms. Existing defenses often require comprehensive attack information or multiple triggered examples, making them impractical when defenders only observe a single reported failure case without knowing whether it stems from a backdoor attack or a natural alignment bug. This paper presents Patcher, a post-hoc defense framework that repairs backdoored language models using only a single reported failure case and the model parameters. Patcher operates in two stages. First, it localizes backdoor triggers by computing response-conditioned gradient-based saliency scores and applying adaptive clustering to separate triggers from benign context. Second, it patches the model through a constrained fine-tuning objective that breaks the trigger-response association while preserving benign-task utility and robustness to non-triggered jailbreak attacks through KL-divergence constraints. We conduct extensive evaluations across multiple backdoor attack strategies and demonstrate that Patcher successfully localizes triggers and neutralizes backdoors while maintaining model utility. We further show robustness against adaptive attacks designed to evade our defense. This work represents a significant step toward practical defenses against training-time attacks in deployed language models. Comments: To appear in the USENIX Security Symposium, 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Information Retrieval (cs.IR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2606.02995 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2606.02995v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.02995 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Minghong Fang [view email] [v1] Tue, 2 Jun 2026 01:11:58 UTC (503 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.IR cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Jun 03, 2026
    Archived
    Jun 03, 2026
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