Quantifying Side-Channel Leakage in Public Metrology Releases
arXiv SecurityArchived Jun 03, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2606.02934v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Public scientific and metrology releases can leak the hidden settings that produced them. We formalize and quantify this risk as a profiled statistical side-channel audit: a release map exposes finite-band statistics of a power spectral density (PSD), a profiled observer trains labeled template spectra under an explicit budget, and a challenge release is drawn from one of two utility-equivalent recipes separated by a protected coordinate. Averaged
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 1 Jun 2026]
Quantifying Side-Channel Leakage in Public Metrology Releases
Faruk Alpay, Taylan Alpay
Public scientific and metrology releases can leak the hidden settings that produced them. We formalize and quantify this risk as a profiled statistical side-channel audit: a release map exposes finite-band statistics of a power spectral density (PSD), a profiled observer trains labeled template spectra under an explicit budget, and a challenge release is drawn from one of two utility-equivalent recipes separated by a protected coordinate. Averaged PSD bins follow a gamma channel, replaced by a covariance-weighted log-spectrum channel when the bins are correlated; this yields exact Kullback-Leibler divergences, Chernoff exponents, protected-bit advantage bounds, and finite-training, finite-library, finite-compute, and model-mismatch corrections. Our headline result is a finite-band transport-leakage law: after amplitude and blur are eliminated, the protected acid-transport information obeys I_{\lambda|\alpha,\beta}(K) = (64/1225)\, w \lambda^{6} K^{9} + O(w \lambda^{8} K^{11}) for K\lambda \ll 1, a ninth-order exponent with a closed-form safe band. A step-by-step protocol turns a measured release into these numbers, and a fixed-seed reproducibility package regenerates every table and figure. We instantiate the audit on screened extreme-ultraviolet (EUV) roughness spectra as a model-conditioned case study, with deployment on measured releases the next step.
Comments: 30 pages, 7 figures, 8 tables; ancillary reproducibility package included
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Information Theory (cs.IT)
MSC classes: 94A60, 62B10, 62F03, 94A17, 60G35
Cite as: arXiv:2606.02934 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.02934v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.02934
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Submission history
From: Taylan Alpay [view email]
[v1] Mon, 1 Jun 2026 22:32:02 UTC (146 KB)
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Ancillary files (details):
README.md
checksums.sha256
data/digitized_psd_points.csv
data/published_18nm_scale.csv
data/synthetic_configurations.csv
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