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arXiv:2605.30534v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Polymorphic Prompt Assembling (PPA) defends LLM agents against prompt injections by randomly selecting separator pairs from a fixed pool to isolate user input from system instructions. Although effective, static pool reuse exposes a blast-radius vulnerability: once a separator leaks, it can be exploited in future requests. We propose a dynamic per-request separator generation using domain-separated SHA-256 digests keyed on the timestamp, session id
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 28 May 2026]
Strengthening Polymorphic Prompt Assembling: Dynamic Separator Generation Against Emerging Prompt Injection Attacks
Nima Dorzhiev, Peng Liu
Polymorphic Prompt Assembling (PPA) defends LLM agents against prompt injections by randomly selecting separator pairs from a fixed pool to isolate user input from system instructions. Although effective, static pool reuse exposes a blast-radius vulnerability: once a separator leaks, it can be exploited in future requests. We propose a dynamic per-request separator generation using domain-separated SHA-256 digests keyed on the timestamp, session identifier, and cryptographic nonce. Each assembled prompt receives a unique (BEGIN, END) canary pair, thereby limiting leakage exposure to a single request. We evaluated our extension against 16 injection payloads on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct-Turbo, with cross-model validation on DeepSeek-V4-Flash model. Against the M1 obfuscation payload (leetspeak + urgency), the dynamic mode reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) from 0.88 to 0.38, yielding a statistically significant 2.3 x mitigation verified by non-overlapping 95% Wilson confidence intervals. Against format_breakout_salad, static separator leakage (leak_rate = 0.467) is eliminated entirely in the dynamic mode (0.000), confirming the blast-radius reduction in practice. The implementation requires no model fine-tuning, adds 2.7 microseconds prompt-assembly overhead per request, and is backward compatible with the existing PPA SDK.
Comments: 5 pages, 3 tables, 1 figure
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.30534 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.30534v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.30534
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Submission history
From: Nima Dorzhiev [view email]
[v1] Thu, 28 May 2026 20:10:04 UTC (80 KB)
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