Protecting On-Device AI Inference: A Systematic Review of Attacks and Defence Mechanisms

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 28 May 2026] Protecting On-Device AI Inference: A Systematic Review of Attacks and Defence Mechanisms Zisis Tsiatsikas, Alexandros Fakis, Georgios Karopoulos, Vasileios Kouliaridis, Marios Anagnostopoulos The need for secure and private Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) on edge and mobile devices has increased the necessity of protecting the architecture of these systems from threats to both security and privacy. With an ever-increasing number of pre-trained AI models being used on mobile platforms for client-side inference, there are rising concerns about the risks associated with the theft/extraction of AI models, adversarial attacks on AI models, and data breaches. As a result of this trend, a variety of defence mechanisms have been proposed to protect against these threats. These include Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), homomorphic encryption, obfuscation, and differential privacy, among others. However, current surveys largely focus on edge intelligence, which includes distributed training, and thus overlook security and privacy issues that are specific to on-device AI inference. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first comprehensive review of threats and corresponding defence mechanisms targeting on-device inference. Our results show that the attack and defence literature are unbalanced: approximately one quarter of the surveyed attack papers focus on Intellectual Property (IP) attacks, whereas half of the defence solutions tackle the same issue. More importantly, some attack categories have no defence paper associated to them, such as adversarial attacks that account for roughly one third of the attack literature. This asymmetry between known attacks and available mitigations highlights clear opportunities for future research on securing on-device AI inference. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2605.29450 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.29450v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.29450 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Zisis Tsiatsikas [view email] [v1] Thu, 28 May 2026 06:44:46 UTC (594 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)