A Secure, Manifest-Based Framework for Delegated Privilege Promotion
arXiv SecurityArchived May 29, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.28991v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large-scale enterprise software systems commonly run as unprivileged service accounts to enforce least privilege, yet still depend on a small set of privileged components -- such as executables with elevated ownership, permissions, or capabilities -- for narrowly scoped operations. This creates a persistent security and operational conflict during maintenance. Automated patching tools running without elevated privileges cannot safely update privile
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 27 May 2026]
A Secure, Manifest-Based Framework for Delegated Privilege Promotion
Rajarshi Chowdhury, Akshay Shah
Large-scale enterprise software systems commonly run as unprivileged service accounts to enforce least privilege, yet still depend on a small set of privileged components -- such as executables with elevated ownership, permissions, or capabilities -- for narrowly scoped operations. This creates a persistent security and operational conflict during maintenance. Automated patching tools running without elevated privileges cannot safely update privileged components without either executing the entire patch with full administrative rights or requiring manual administrator intervention. We present a secure, manifest-based infrastructure for delegated promotion of privileged software components, deployed in production as part of a large-scale enterprise database system serving both cloud and on-premises installations. The design centers on a minimal privileged mediator that validates cryptographically protected metadata and allows an unprivileged process to promote only vendor-approved files. The system explicitly mitigates Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) attacks using file-descriptor-bound validation and promotion, supports offline key rotation and revocation, and enables zero-downtime self-update via atomic replacement.
Comments: Accepted at the 56th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2026). 7 pages, 6 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Operating Systems (cs.OS)
ACM classes: D.4.6; K.6.5; D.2.7
Cite as: arXiv:2605.28991 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.28991v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.28991
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Submission history
From: Rajarshi Chowdhury [view email]
[v1] Wed, 27 May 2026 18:48:47 UTC (383 KB)
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