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AIRGuard: Guarding Agent Actions with Runtime Authority Control

arXiv Security Archived May 29, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.28914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using language agents turn model decisions into external side effects: they read files, run scripts, call APIs, send messages, and invoke Model Context Protocol tools. This makes agent attacks different from jailbreaks. The harmful step is often not an obviously forbidden output, but an ordinary executable action that becomes unsafe because attacker-controlled context steers authorized access against the user's interest. We identify this failu

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 27 May 2026] AIRGuard: Guarding Agent Actions with Runtime Authority Control Suliu Qin, Haomin Zhuang, Yujun Zhou, Yufei Han, Xiangliang Zhang Tool-using language agents turn model decisions into external side effects: they read files, run scripts, call APIs, send messages, and invoke Model Context Protocol tools. This makes agent attacks different from jailbreaks. The harmful step is often not an obviously forbidden output, but an ordinary executable action that becomes unsafe because attacker-controlled context steers authorized access against the user's interest. We identify this failure mode as authority confusion: untrusted resources may inform reasoning, but they must not authorize side effects. We present AIRGuard, a runtime guard that operationalizes least privilege as action-time authorization. AIRGuard normalizes heterogeneous tool calls, derives task authority into step-level authority, tracks source and target trust, simulates sensitive side effects, audits cross-step risk, and enforces decisions before actions execute. On AgentTrap, AIRGuard reduces Sonnet 4.6 attack success from 36.3% without defense to 5.5%. On DTAP-150, AIRGuard preserves 76.0% benign utility with Haiku 4.5, compared with 52.0% for ARGUS and 42.0% for MELON. An ablation further shows that prompt-only policy helps only modestly, whereas a dedicated runtime authority-control layer gives the agent system direct control over tool-mediated side effects. Code and data are available at this https URL. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.28914 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.28914v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.28914 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Suliu Qin [view email] [v1] Wed, 27 May 2026 17:48:14 UTC (4,663 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 29, 2026
    Archived
    May 29, 2026
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