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Backdoor Attacks on Fault Detection and Localization in Cyber-Physical Systems

arXiv Security Archived May 28, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.27674v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various controllers are used in CPS to ensure the system detects and recovers from faults, such as voltage fluctuations, and to perform load balancing in distribution systems. Machine learning- and deep learning-based fault det

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 26 May 2026] Backdoor Attacks on Fault Detection and Localization in Cyber-Physical Systems Abile Jean, Kuniyilh S Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various controllers are used in CPS to ensure the system detects and recovers from faults, such as voltage fluctuations, and to perform load balancing in distribution systems. Machine learning- and deep learning-based fault detection and localization frameworks have recently gained significant attention in CPS for their ability to identify anomalies and operational failures in real time. However, these intelligent models are vulnerable to adversarial machine learning attacks, particularly backdoor attacks. In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects malicious patterns into the training data so that the model behaves normally most of the time but produces attacker-controlled outputs when triggered by specific patterns. This paper investigates the threat of backdoor attacks against fault detection and localization mechanisms in recent ML pipelines used in modern CPS systems. We define these threats and explore how they can be realized by designing triggers and evaluating their success in the CPS domain. Our experiments show the attack is successful even with 10\% of poisoning. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2605.27674 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.27674v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.27674 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Simi Kuniyilh [view email] [v1] Tue, 26 May 2026 20:49:42 UTC (1,635 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 28, 2026
    Archived
    May 28, 2026
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