MemMorph: Tool Hijacking in LLM Agents via Memory Poisoning
arXiv SecurityArchived May 27, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.26154v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-driven agents are capable of selecting external tools to complete users' tasks. However, attackers could compromise such process, steering agents toward inappropriate/wrong tools and enabling malicious actions. Most existing attacks primarily manipulate the tool metadata, which is easily detectable by auditing and may lose effectiveness as modern agents increasingly adopt memory modules to refine tool selection policies through accumulated expe
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 24 May 2026]
MemMorph: Tool Hijacking in LLM Agents via Memory Poisoning
Xuanye Zhang, Yongsen Zheng, Zhuqin Xu, Kaiyu Zhou, Bowen Shen, Haoran Ou, Tianwei Zhang, Kwok-Yan Lam
LLM-driven agents are capable of selecting external tools to complete users' tasks. However, attackers could compromise such process, steering agents toward inappropriate/wrong tools and enabling malicious actions. Most existing attacks primarily manipulate the tool metadata, which is easily detectable by auditing and may lose effectiveness as modern agents increasingly adopt memory modules to refine tool selection policies through accumulated experience. This paper proposes MemMorph, the first attack that bias tool selection by poisoning the agent's long-term memory. Rather than explicitly dictating the tool invocation decision, MemMorph injects a small number of crafted records that are disguised as technical facts, incident reports, and operational policies. These poisoned records reshape the agent's contextual perception and decision-making process, leading it to autonomously infer and select the tool preferred by the attacker. Experiments across 3 benchmarks, 10 agent backbones, and 3 memory-module implementations show that MemMorph achieves up to 85.9% attack success rate with only three injected records, outperforming the strongest baseline by up to 25% while retaining potency under 3 representative defenses. Our findings expose long-term memory as a critical and under-explored attack surface in tool-augmented agents, urging the development of memory-level integrity safeguards.
Comments: Preprint. Under review
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.26154 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.26154v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.26154
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From: Xuanye Zhang [view email]
[v1] Sun, 24 May 2026 04:26:13 UTC (2,295 KB)
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