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AEX: Non-Intrusive Multi-Hop Attestation and Provenance for LLM APIs

arXiv Security Archived Mar 17, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.14283v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Hosted large language models are increasingly accessed through remote APIs, but the API boundary still offers little direct evidence that a returned output actually corresponds to the client-visible request. Recent audits of shadow APIs show that unofficial or intermediary endpoints can diverge from claimed behavior, while existing approaches such as fingerprinting, model-equality testing, verifiable inference, and TEE attestation either remain inf

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✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 15 Mar 2026] AEX: Non-Intrusive Multi-Hop Attestation and Provenance for LLM APIs Yongjie Guan Hosted large language models are increasingly accessed through remote APIs, but the API boundary still offers little direct evidence that a returned output actually corresponds to the client-visible request. Recent audits of shadow APIs show that unofficial or intermediary endpoints can diverge from claimed behavior, while existing approaches such as fingerprinting, model-equality testing, verifiable inference, and TEE attestation either remain inferential or answer different questions. We propose AEX, a non-intrusive attestation extension for existing JSON-based LLM APIs. AEX preserves request, response, tool-calling, streaming, and error semantics, and instead adds a signed top-level attestation object that binds a client-visible request projection to either a complete response object or a committed streaming output. To support realistic deployments, AEX provides explicit request-binding modes, signed request-transform receipts for trusted intermediaries, and source-output / output-transform receipts for trusted output rewriting. For streaming, it separates checkpoint proofs for verified prefixes of an unmodified source stream from complete-output lineage for outputs that have been rewritten, buffered, aggregated, or re-packaged, preventing transformed outputs from being mistaken for source-stream prefixes. AEX therefore makes a deliberately narrow claim: a trusted issuer attests to a specific request-output relation, or to a specific complete-output lineage, at the API boundary. We present the protocol design, threat model, verification state machine, security and privacy analysis, an OpenAI-compatible chat-completions profile, and a reference TypeScript prototype with local conformance tests and microbenchmarks. Comments: 29 pages total; 6 figures; 4 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.14283 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.14283v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.14283 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yongjie Guan [view email] [v1] Sun, 15 Mar 2026 08:42:39 UTC (163 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Mar 17, 2026
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