AEX: Non-Intrusive Multi-Hop Attestation and Provenance for LLM APIs
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 17, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.14283v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Hosted large language models are increasingly accessed through remote APIs, but the API boundary still offers little direct evidence that a returned output actually corresponds to the client-visible request. Recent audits of shadow APIs show that unofficial or intermediary endpoints can diverge from claimed behavior, while existing approaches such as fingerprinting, model-equality testing, verifiable inference, and TEE attestation either remain inf
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 15 Mar 2026]
AEX: Non-Intrusive Multi-Hop Attestation and Provenance for LLM APIs
Yongjie Guan
Hosted large language models are increasingly accessed through remote APIs, but the API boundary still offers little direct evidence that a returned output actually corresponds to the client-visible request. Recent audits of shadow APIs show that unofficial or intermediary endpoints can diverge from claimed behavior, while existing approaches such as fingerprinting, model-equality testing, verifiable inference, and TEE attestation either remain inferential or answer different questions. We propose AEX, a non-intrusive attestation extension for existing JSON-based LLM APIs. AEX preserves request, response, tool-calling, streaming, and error semantics, and instead adds a signed top-level attestation object that binds a client-visible request projection to either a complete response object or a committed streaming output. To support realistic deployments, AEX provides explicit request-binding modes, signed request-transform receipts for trusted intermediaries, and source-output / output-transform receipts for trusted output rewriting. For streaming, it separates checkpoint proofs for verified prefixes of an unmodified source stream from complete-output lineage for outputs that have been rewritten, buffered, aggregated, or re-packaged, preventing transformed outputs from being mistaken for source-stream prefixes. AEX therefore makes a deliberately narrow claim: a trusted issuer attests to a specific request-output relation, or to a specific complete-output lineage, at the API boundary. We present the protocol design, threat model, verification state machine, security and privacy analysis, an OpenAI-compatible chat-completions profile, and a reference TypeScript prototype with local conformance tests and microbenchmarks.
Comments: 29 pages total; 6 figures; 4 tables
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.14283 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.14283v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.14283
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Submission history
From: Yongjie Guan [view email]
[v1] Sun, 15 Mar 2026 08:42:39 UTC (163 KB)
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