arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 17, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.13864v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Real-world backdoor attacks often require poisoned datasets to be stored and transmitted before being used to compromise deep learning systems. However, in the era of big data, the inevitable use of lossy compression poses a fundamental challenge to invisible backdoor attacks. We find that triggers embedded in RGB images often become ineffective after the images are lossily compressed into binary bitstreams (e.g., JPEG files) for storage and transm
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 Mar 2026]
Inevitable Encounters: Backdoor Attacks Involving Lossy Compression
Qian Li, Yunuo Chen, Yuntian Chen
Real-world backdoor attacks often require poisoned datasets to be stored and transmitted before being used to compromise deep learning systems. However, in the era of big data, the inevitable use of lossy compression poses a fundamental challenge to invisible backdoor attacks. We find that triggers embedded in RGB images often become ineffective after the images are lossily compressed into binary bitstreams (e.g., JPEG files) for storage and transmission. As a result, the poisoned data lose its malicious effect after compression, causing backdoor injection to fail. In this paper, we highlight the necessity of explicitly accounting for the lossy compression process in backdoor attacks. This requires attackers to ensure that the transmitted binary bitstreams preserve malicious trigger information, so that effective triggers can be recovered in the decompressed data. Building on the region-of-interest (ROI) coding mechanism in image compression, we propose two poisoning strategies tailored to inevitable lossy compression. First, we introduce Universal Attack Activation, a universal method that uses sample-specific ROI masks to reactivate trigger information in binary bitstreams for learned image compression (LIC). Second, we present Compression-Adapted Attack, a new attack strategy that employs customized ROI masks to encode trigger information into binary bitstreams and is applicable to both traditional codecs and LIC. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of both strategies.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.13864 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.13864v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.13864
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Yunuo Chen [view email]
[v1] Sat, 14 Mar 2026 09:45:59 UTC (1,714 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-03
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.CV
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)