Methods for Formal Verification of Agent Skills: Three Layers Toward a Mechanically Checkable Capability-Containment Proof
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arXiv:2605.23951v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The companion paper introduced a four-level verification lattice on agent-skill manifests (unverified, declared, tested, formal) and left the top level aspirational. This paper closes that gap. We give a precise semantics for skill behaviour faithful to how a skill is consumed by an LLM-driven runtime (a deterministic script-side reachable through a non-deterministic LLM-side), state the verification problem as a capability-containment property ove
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Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 9 May 2026]
Methods for Formal Verification of Agent Skills: Three Layers Toward a Mechanically Checkable Capability-Containment Proof
Alfredo Metere
The companion paper introduced a four-level verification lattice on agent-skill manifests (unverified, declared, tested, formal) and left the top level aspirational. This
paper closes that gap. We give a precise semantics for skill behaviour faithful to how a skill is consumed by an LLM-driven runtime (a deterministic script-side reachable
through a non-deterministic LLM-side), state the verification problem as a capability-containment property over that semantics, and present three composable methods that
together raise a skill from declared or tested to formal: (1) sound static capability-containment analysis of the script-side via abstract interpretation over a small effect
lattice; (2) a refinement type system for tool-call envelopes that mechanically rejects any call whose statically-inferred capability is not in the manifest's declared set;
(3) SMT-bounded model checking against the parent paper's biconditional correctness criterion, with the bound chosen so any counter-example fitting the runtime's
transaction-buffer horizon is exhibited as a concrete trace. We prove the three layers composed soundly cover the parent paper's threat model modulo a single residual (the
LLM's freedom to refuse to act) that the parent paper's runtime biconditional catches at session boundary. The methods reuse existing well-engineered tools (Z3, Semgrep,
CodeQL, refinement-type checkers, mechanised proof assistants) rather than asking operators to build new ones, and the proof-carrying artifact extends the existing this http URL
convention. All three methods plus the bundle producer and re-checker ship as zero-dependency JavaScript modules in the open-source enclawed framework
(this https URL project page this https URL), with 53 unit tests and an end-to-end CLI demo on a sample skill.
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.23951 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2605.23951v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23951
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Submission history
From: Alfredo Metere [view email]
[v1] Sat, 9 May 2026 19:27:38 UTC (45 KB)
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