CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning

Purifying Generative LLMs from Backdoors without Prior Knowledge or Clean Reference

arXiv Security Archived Mar 17, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.13461v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose severe security threats to large language models (LLMs), where a model behaves normally under benign inputs but produces malicious outputs when a hidden trigger appears. Existing backdoor removal methods typically assume prior knowledge of triggers, access to a clean reference model, or rely on aggressive finetuning configurations, and are often limited to classification tasks. However, such assumptions fall apart in real-worl

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Mar 2026] Purifying Generative LLMs from Backdoors without Prior Knowledge or Clean Reference Jianwei Li, Jung-Eun Kim Backdoor attacks pose severe security threats to large language models (LLMs), where a model behaves normally under benign inputs but produces malicious outputs when a hidden trigger appears. Existing backdoor removal methods typically assume prior knowledge of triggers, access to a clean reference model, or rely on aggressive finetuning configurations, and are often limited to classification tasks. However, such assumptions fall apart in real-world instruction-tuned LLM settings. In this work, we propose a new framework for purifying instruction-tuned LLM without any prior trigger knowledge or clean references. Through systematic sanity checks, we find that backdoor associations are redundantly encoded across MLP layers, while attention modules primarily amplify trigger signals without establishing the behavior. Leveraging this insight, we shift the focus from isolating specific backdoor triggers to cutting off the trigger-behavior associations, and design an immunization-inspired elimination approach: by constructing multiple synthetic backdoored variants of the given suspicious model, each trained with different malicious trigger-behavior pairs, and contrasting them with their clean counterparts. The recurring modifications across variants reveal a shared "backdoor signature"-analogous to antigens in a virus. Guided by this signature, we neutralize highly suspicious components in LLM and apply lightweight finetuning to restore its fluency, producing purified models that withstand diverse backdoor attacks and threat models while preserving generative capability. Comments: ICLR 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2603.13461 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.13461v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.13461 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jung-Eun Kim [view email] [v1] Fri, 13 Mar 2026 17:09:37 UTC (1,249 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Archived
    Mar 17, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗