MemMark: State-Evolution Attribution Watermarking for Agent Long-Term Memory Systems
arXiv SecurityArchived May 26, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.25002v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Memory-backed agents need provenance that can survive leaked or migrated snapshots, where logs, visible outputs, and trusted metadata may be absent. We propose MemMark, a state-evolution attribution watermark that embeds an owner-controlled signal into latent memory-write decisions. At each internal LLM call, MemMark samples among admissible candidates using keyed, distribution-preserving selection, and records cryptographic commitments with signed
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 24 May 2026]
MemMark: State-Evolution Attribution Watermarking for Agent Long-Term Memory Systems
Haobo Zhang, Xutao Mao, Guangyuan Dong, Ziwei Li, Xuanbo Su, Kaijie Chen, Jing Yang, Zheng Lin
Memory-backed agents need provenance that can survive leaked or migrated snapshots, where logs, visible outputs, and trusted metadata may be absent. We propose MemMark, a state-evolution attribution watermark that embeds an owner-controlled signal into latent memory-write decisions. At each internal LLM call, MemMark samples among admissible candidates using keyed, distribution-preserving selection, and records cryptographic commitments with signed session anchors and reveal evidence. This makes attribution depend on reproducible backend behavior rather than mutable provenance fields. Across A-Mem and Graphiti on LoCoMo, with three LLM backbones, MemMark preserves memory utility: Overall F1 retains 99.6% of the unwatermarked baseline, while BLEU-1 changes by +0.2%. It also provides usable carrier capacity, with 1.16, 1.14, and 1.26 bits of mean entropy for update-target, link-target, and semantic-realization decisions. In the snapshot-only R3 setting, MemMark recovers the full 40-bit payload from final snapshots, while wrong-key verification remains near chance. Under nine memory-lifecycle attacks, verification distinguishes tampering, evidence deletion, and partial payload recovery. These results show that robust snapshot-only attribution is feasible for long-term agent memory without surviving traces, trusted metadata, or utility-degrading.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.25002 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.25002v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.25002
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Zhang HaoBo [view email]
[v1] Sun, 24 May 2026 11:04:35 UTC (1,993 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-05
Change to browse by:
cs
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)