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Memory-Induced Tool-Drift in LLM Agents

arXiv Security Archived May 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.24941v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced to

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 May 2026] Memory-Induced Tool-Drift in LLM Agents Mahavir Dabas, Jihyun Jeong, Ming Jin, Ruoxi Jia Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to +3.6 points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2605.24941 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.24941v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.24941 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Mahavir Dabas [view email] [v1] Sun, 24 May 2026 08:41:39 UTC (5,376 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 26, 2026
    Archived
    May 26, 2026
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