Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 17, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.13424v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense combines two mechanisms: agent isolation, implemented as a privilege separated two-agent pipeline with tool partitioning, and JSON formatting, which prod
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 13 Mar 2026]
Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection
Darren Cheng, Wen-Kwang Tsao
Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense combines two mechanisms: agent isolation, implemented as a privilege separated two-agent pipeline with tool partitioning, and JSON formatting, which produces structured output that strips persuasive framing before the action agent processes it.
We run four experiments on the same 649 attacks that succeeded against our single-agent baseline. The full pipeline achieves 0 percent attack success rate (ASR) on the evaluated benchmark. Agent isolation alone achieves 0.31 percent ASR, approximately 323 times lower than the baseline. JSON formatting alone achieves 14.18 percent ASR, about 7.1 times lower.
Our ablation study confirms that agent isolation is the dominant mechanism. JSON formatting provides additional hardening but is not sufficient on its own. The defense is structural: the action agent never receives raw injection content regardless of model behavior on any individual input.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.13424 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.13424v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.13424
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Submission history
From: WenKwang Tsao [view email]
[v1] Fri, 13 Mar 2026 02:03:00 UTC (48 KB)
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