CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning

Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection

arXiv Security Archived Mar 17, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.13424v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense combines two mechanisms: agent isolation, implemented as a privilege separated two-agent pipeline with tool partitioning, and JSON formatting, which prod

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Mar 2026] Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection Darren Cheng, Wen-Kwang Tsao Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an open source multitool agent platform. Our proposed defense combines two mechanisms: agent isolation, implemented as a privilege separated two-agent pipeline with tool partitioning, and JSON formatting, which produces structured output that strips persuasive framing before the action agent processes it. We run four experiments on the same 649 attacks that succeeded against our single-agent baseline. The full pipeline achieves 0 percent attack success rate (ASR) on the evaluated benchmark. Agent isolation alone achieves 0.31 percent ASR, approximately 323 times lower than the baseline. JSON formatting alone achieves 14.18 percent ASR, about 7.1 times lower. Our ablation study confirms that agent isolation is the dominant mechanism. JSON formatting provides additional hardening but is not sufficient on its own. The defense is structural: the action agent never receives raw injection content regardless of model behavior on any individual input. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2603.13424 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.13424v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.13424 Focus to learn more Submission history From: WenKwang Tsao [view email] [v1] Fri, 13 Mar 2026 02:03:00 UTC (48 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Archived
    Mar 17, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗