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Reflect-Guard: Enhancing LLM Safeguards against Adversarial Prompts via Logical Self-Reflection

arXiv Security Archived May 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.24834v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) safety classifiers such as Llama Guard are effective at detecting overtly harmful prompts but remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks that disguise malicious intent through role-play scenarios, fictional framing, and indirect requests. We present Reflect-Guard, a method that augments LLM-based safety classifiers with chain-of-thought self-reflection capabilities through parameter-efficient fine-tuning. Our appr

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 24 May 2026] Reflect-Guard: Enhancing LLM Safeguards against Adversarial Prompts via Logical Self-Reflection Lixing Lin, Juli You, Yue Li, Luyun Lin, Yiqing Wang, Zhen Zhang, Moxuan Zheng Large language model (LLM) safety classifiers such as Llama Guard are effective at detecting overtly harmful prompts but remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks that disguise malicious intent through role-play scenarios, fictional framing, and indirect requests. We present Reflect-Guard, a method that augments LLM-based safety classifiers with chain-of-thought self-reflection capabilities through parameter-efficient fine-tuning. Our approach distills analytical reasoning from GPT-4o-mini into structured reflection annotations, then trains Llama-Guard-3-8B via QLoRA to generate logical self-reflections before issuing safety verdicts. Using only 1000 training examples and updating just 0.5% of model parameters (~42M), Reflect-Guard achieves substantial improvements on two challenging benchmarks. On WildGuardTest, F1 score improves from 0.770 to 0.842 (+7.2 pp), with recall on adversarial prompts increasing from 0.513 to 0.921 (+40.8 pp). On JailbreakBench, the attack success rate drops from 10.3% to 1.8%, representing an 82.5% relative reduction. These gains are especially pronounced on adversarial inputs, where the explicit reasoning step enables the model to see through obfuscation techniques that defeat standard pattern-matching approaches. Our results demonstrate that teaching safety classifiers to reason about adversarial intent, rather than simply classify surface patterns, is a promising direction for robust LLM safety. Comments: 12 pages, 2 figures, and 4 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.24834 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.24834v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.24834 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yiqing Wang [view email] [v1] Sun, 24 May 2026 02:58:21 UTC (17 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 26, 2026
    Archived
    May 26, 2026
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