CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning May 26, 2026

Steering Beyond the Support: Adversarial Training on Unsupervised Jailbroken Activation Simulation

arXiv Security Archived May 26, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.24535v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Jailbreak prompts can trigger harmful completions on aligned LLMs, In accordance, safety steering has been proposed: test-time activation interventions that steer jailbreak activations to trigger refusal while preserving benign utility. However, existing steering methods are fundamentally supervised and tied to a static, limited training set, whereas real jailbreaks evolve and are often out-of-distributed from the training set, leading to failures

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 23 May 2026] Steering Beyond the Support: Adversarial Training on Unsupervised Jailbroken Activation Simulation Luoyu Chen, Weiqi Wang, Zhiyi Tian, Chenhan Zhang, Feng Wu, Jianhuan Huang, Ahmed Asiri, Shui Yu Jailbreak prompts can trigger harmful completions on aligned LLMs, In accordance, safety steering has been proposed: test-time activation interventions that steer jailbreak activations to trigger refusal while preserving benign utility. However, existing steering methods are fundamentally supervised and tied to a static, limited training set, whereas real jailbreaks evolve and are often out-of-distributed from the training set, leading to failures on unseen attacks. In this paper, we tackle the failure on unseen jailbreaks problem, base on unsupervised latent direction discovery. We propose a bi-level adversarial training framework for zero-shot jailbreak defense. In the inner step, we simulate diverse jail-broken activations by extrapolating from refusal-state harmful-request activations via unsupervised latent direction discovery, which expands the coverage of real jailbreak activation subspaces. In the outer step, we train a potential-induced steering field to push these adversarial jailbroken states into refusal regions while keeping benign unchanged. Across three LLMs and six classical jailbreak families, our method achieves strong defense with attack success rates mostly below 5%, and rising subspace coverage throughout training helps explain the improved generalization. Comments: accepted by ICML 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2605.24535 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.24535v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.24535 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Luoyu Chen [view email] [v1] Sat, 23 May 2026 12:07:38 UTC (11,626 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 26, 2026
    Archived
    May 26, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗