MemAudit: Post-hoc Auditing of Poisoned Agent Memory via Causal Attribution and Structural Anomaly Detection
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arXiv:2605.23723v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model agents increasingly rely on persistent memory to store past interactions, retrieve relevant demonstrations, and improve long-horizon task execution. However, this memory mechanism also creates a practical security vulnerability: an adversarial user may inject malicious records into the agent's memory through ordinary interaction, and these records can later be retrieved to steer the agent's reasoning and actions. Existing defen
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 22 May 2026]
MemAudit: Post-hoc Auditing of Poisoned Agent Memory via Causal Attribution and Structural Anomaly Detection
Zhewen Tan, Yilun Yao, Huiyan Jin, Wenhan Yu, Guoan Wang, Mengyuan Fan, liang lu, Feng Liu, Xiangzheng Zhang, Duohe Ma, Tong Yang, Lin Sun
Large language model agents increasingly rely on persistent memory to store past interactions, retrieve relevant demonstrations, and improve long-horizon task execution. However, this memory mechanism also creates a practical security vulnerability: an adversarial user may inject malicious records into the agent's memory through ordinary interaction, and these records can later be retrieved to steer the agent's reasoning and actions. Existing defenses primarily focus on online intervention, such as prompt filtering or output blocking, but they do not address the post-hoc question of which stored memories are responsible after harmful behavior has already been observed. We propose \textbf{MemAudit}, a post-hoc causal memory auditing framework for memory-augmented LLM agents. The framework combines two complementary signals: (1) a counterfactual memory influence score that measures each memory's causal contribution to harmful outputs, and (2) a memory consistency graph that identifies structurally anomalous memories within the broader memory store. We evaluate MemAudit against MINJA, a query-only memory injection attack in which malicious records are generated and stored through normal agent interactions rather than direct memory-bank modification. Across both QA and reasoning-agent settings, MemAudit substantially reduces attack success rates under realistic post-hoc auditing scenarios. The results show that QA attack success is reduced from 70\% to 0\%, while RAP attack success drops from 83.3\% to 0\%.
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.23723 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2605.23723v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23723
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From: Zhewen Tan [view email]
[v1] Fri, 22 May 2026 15:03:13 UTC (173 KB)
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