A Commitment-based Authentication model for Key Exchange protocols
arXiv SecurityArchived May 25, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2307.15465v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: In this work we construct an alternative model for Authenticated Key Exchange, intended to build a theoretic security framework for protocols whose characteristics may not always concur with the specifics of already existing models for authenticated exchanges. This model is constructed in a modular way, from the notion of commitment schemes and employing ephemeral information, therefore avoiding the exchange of long-term cryptographic material.
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 28 Jul 2023 (v1), last revised 22 May 2026 (this version, v4)]
A Commitment-based Authentication model for Key Exchange protocols
Rodrigo Martín Sánchez-Ledesma, David Domingo Martín, Iván Blanco Chacón, Ignacio Luengo Velasco
In this work we construct an alternative model for Authenticated Key Exchange, intended to build a theoretic security framework for protocols whose characteristics may not always concur with the specifics of already existing models for authenticated exchanges. This model is constructed in a modular way, from the notion of commitment schemes and employing ephemeral information, therefore avoiding the exchange of long-term cryptographic material. From this model, we propose a number of Commitment-based protocols to establish a shared secret between two parties, and study their resistance over unauthenticated channels. This means analyzing the security of the protocol itself, and its robustness against Man-in-the-Middle attacks, by formalizing their security under this model. The protocols are constructed from Key Agreement (KA) and Key Encapsulation (KEM) primitives, to show that this model can be applied to both established and new paradigms. We highlight the differences that arise naturally, due to the nature of KEM constructions, in terms of the protocol itself and the types of attacks that they are subject to. We provide practical go-to protocols instances to migrate to, both for KEM-based and KA-based cryptographic primitives.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2307.15465 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2307.15465v4 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2307.15465
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Journal reference: International Journal of Computer Mathematics: Computer Systems Theory (2026)
Related DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/23799927.2026.2677687
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Submission history
From: Rodrigo Martín Sánchez-Ledesma [view email]
[v1] Fri, 28 Jul 2023 10:35:35 UTC (457 KB)
[v2] Sat, 9 Dec 2023 17:50:34 UTC (31 KB)
[v3] Tue, 1 Oct 2024 20:41:38 UTC (38 KB)
[v4] Fri, 22 May 2026 16:39:55 UTC (35 KB)
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