Intercloud: Eventual Consistency for Decentralised Economies via Chilling-Effect Consensus
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arXiv:2605.22830v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present Intercloud, a decentralised economic network in which streams of private data are secured by Watcher swarms that observe only cryptographic hashes, never plaintext. Intercloud requires no global consensus beyond a single shared random seed per epoch. Two mechanisms provide security: (i) ripple deduplication via epoch-stamped identifiers, preventing any ripple from propagating through the same node twice per epoch, guaranteeing terminat
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Computer Science > Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing
[Submitted on 21 Apr 2026]
Intercloud: Eventual Consistency for Decentralised Economies via Chilling-Effect Consensus
Gregory Magarshak
We present Intercloud, a decentralised economic network in which streams of private data are secured by Watcher swarms that observe only cryptographic hashes, never plaintext. Intercloud requires no global consensus beyond a single shared random seed per epoch. Two mechanisms provide security: (i) ripple deduplication via epoch-stamped identifiers, preventing any ripple from propagating through the same node twice per epoch, guaranteeing termination without global coordination; and (ii) chilling-effect consensus, in which a swarm reaches finality by attesting to the absence of conflicting evidence rather than voting between alternatives. Any conflicting attestation automatically yields a self-certifying Proof of Corruption.
We prove four main results. First, execution ripples terminate in bounded time via the ripple-ID mechanism. Second, a swarm of about 35 Watchers -- assigned by a verifiable random function, independent of total network size -- suffices for double-spending prevention, matching Hoepman's lower bound. Third, two correct clients can hold conflicting finality attestations only if the adversary compromises a supermajority of the assigned swarm or eclipses both clients from all honest nodes; we prove necessity and sufficiency. Fourth, Buridan's Principle does not apply: the consensus question is absence of evidence, not a binary choice on a continuous input.
We also develop a complete economic model. Local coins are issued and retired by currency streams; security weight tracks value automatically as Intercoin weight adjusts at each epoch shuffle. Junior nodes detect corruption and earn lottery rewards for propagating Proofs of Corruption; vesting makes corruption economically irrational. The coin and content layers are strictly separated: regulators observe weight flows without learning amounts, coin types, identities, or rules.
Comments: 11 pages, 1 table, IEEE conference format. Companion paper to "The Magarshak Machine" (Magarshak, 2026)
Subjects: Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
MSC classes: 68M14, 91B26, 94A60, 68M12
ACM classes: C.2.4; H.3.4; K.6.5
Cite as: arXiv:2605.22830 [cs.DC]
(or arXiv:2605.22830v1 [cs.DC] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.22830
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Submission history
From: Gregory Magarshak [view email]
[v1] Tue, 21 Apr 2026 14:33:45 UTC (26 KB)
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