PoisonForge: Task-Level Targeted Poisoning Benchmark for Instruction-Tuned LLMs
arXiv SecurityArchived May 25, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.23168v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When practitioners fine-tune LLMs on unvetted datasets, an adversary can exploit the data supply chain through task-level poisoning: inserting a small number of crafted instruction-response pairs that cause the model to embed attacker-specified entities, such as a country, in outputs for a targeted task family while behaving normally elsewhere. We introduce PoisonForge, a benchmark that parameterizes this threat along four dimensions (bias type, po
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 22 May 2026]
PoisonForge: Task-Level Targeted Poisoning Benchmark for Instruction-Tuned LLMs
Luze Sun, Anshuman Suri, Harsh Chaudhari, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Alina Oprea
When practitioners fine-tune LLMs on unvetted datasets, an adversary can exploit the data supply chain through task-level poisoning: inserting a small number of crafted instruction-response pairs that cause the model to embed attacker-specified entities, such as a country, in outputs for a targeted task family while behaving normally elsewhere. We introduce PoisonForge, a benchmark that parameterizes this threat along four dimensions (bias type, poisoning mode, appearance count, and target output length) and evaluates 12 open-weight models (from 2B to 32B parameters) across five families under a primarily 1% poison budget. With only 10 poisoned examples among 1,000 fine-tuning examples, 11 of 12 models exceed a 70% attack success rate (ASR) in their most vulnerable configuration. Meanwhile, unintended leakage to non-target tasks remains below 0.5%, and models perform well on standard benchmarks. We analyze in detail the factors contributing to attack success. We observe that multiple appearances of an entity increase the ASR, the optimal poisoning mode depends on the semantic structure of the target entity, and ASR drops monotonically with the task output length. A correlation analysis and risk prediction model confirm that poisoning design choices, rather than model scale, are the primary causes of attack success, and that these patterns generalize to predict attack success on new tasks. We release all configurations, pipelines, and analysis code to support reproducible comparisons.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.23168 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.23168v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23168
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From: Luze Sun [view email]
[v1] Fri, 22 May 2026 02:41:13 UTC (1,717 KB)
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