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What Does the Server See? Understanding Privacy Leakage from Large Language Models in Split Inference

arXiv Security Archived May 25, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.23158v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of large language models (LLMs) on resource-constrained devices remains challenging, spurring interest in split inference, where models are partitioned between client and server to reduce computational burden and enhance privacy by transmitting only intermediate activations. However, the privacy-preserving capabilities of split inference, particularly in the context of LLMs, have not been exhaustively investigated. To fill this gap,

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 22 May 2026] What Does the Server See? Understanding Privacy Leakage from Large Language Models in Split Inference Mingyuan Fan, Yu Liu, Fuyi Wang, Cen Chen The deployment of large language models (LLMs) on resource-constrained devices remains challenging, spurring interest in split inference, where models are partitioned between client and server to reduce computational burden and enhance privacy by transmitting only intermediate activations. However, the privacy-preserving capabilities of split inference, particularly in the context of LLMs, have not been exhaustively investigated. To fill this gap, we introduce ActInv, which solves an intermediate activation matching problem to reconstruct the client's input. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that ActInv achieves high-fidelity reconstructions, even in the presence of common perturbation-based defenses such as Gaussian noise injection and activation sparsification. To systematically understand this vulnerability, we develop Perturbation Amplification Factor (PAF), a metric for quantifying a layer's inherent resistance to reconstruction. Our analysis reveals that privacy vulnerability is not uniform across layers, with some layers being highly susceptible to leakage while others offer natural resistance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that defense effectiveness can be significantly improved by calibrating perturbation directions to maximize reconstruction error during backpropagation. Building on these insights, we design PriPert and conduct comprehensive evaluations, covering privacy, utility, and computational overhead, to demonstrate its effectiveness. Comments: Accepted to ACM CCS'26 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2605.23158 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.23158v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23158 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Mingyuan Fan [view email] [v1] Fri, 22 May 2026 02:14:16 UTC (386 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 25, 2026
    Archived
    May 25, 2026
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