What Does the Server See? Understanding Privacy Leakage from Large Language Models in Split Inference
arXiv SecurityArchived May 25, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.23158v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of large language models (LLMs) on resource-constrained devices remains challenging, spurring interest in split inference, where models are partitioned between client and server to reduce computational burden and enhance privacy by transmitting only intermediate activations. However, the privacy-preserving capabilities of split inference, particularly in the context of LLMs, have not been exhaustively investigated. To fill this gap,
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 22 May 2026]
What Does the Server See? Understanding Privacy Leakage from Large Language Models in Split Inference
Mingyuan Fan, Yu Liu, Fuyi Wang, Cen Chen
The deployment of large language models (LLMs) on resource-constrained devices remains challenging, spurring interest in split inference, where models are partitioned between client and server to reduce computational burden and enhance privacy by transmitting only intermediate activations. However, the privacy-preserving capabilities of split inference, particularly in the context of LLMs, have not been exhaustively investigated. To fill this gap, we introduce ActInv, which solves an intermediate activation matching problem to reconstruct the client's input. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that ActInv achieves high-fidelity reconstructions, even in the presence of common perturbation-based defenses such as Gaussian noise injection and activation sparsification. To systematically understand this vulnerability, we develop Perturbation Amplification Factor (PAF), a metric for quantifying a layer's inherent resistance to reconstruction. Our analysis reveals that privacy vulnerability is not uniform across layers, with some layers being highly susceptible to leakage while others offer natural resistance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that defense effectiveness can be significantly improved by calibrating perturbation directions to maximize reconstruction error during backpropagation. Building on these insights, we design PriPert and conduct comprehensive evaluations, covering privacy, utility, and computational overhead, to demonstrate its effectiveness.
Comments: Accepted to ACM CCS'26
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.23158 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.23158v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23158
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From: Mingyuan Fan [view email]
[v1] Fri, 22 May 2026 02:14:16 UTC (386 KB)
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