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Encrypted Neural Networks without Overflows

arXiv Security Archived May 25, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.23096v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables private inference by evaluating neural networks on encrypted data. In this way, we can delegate the computation to a third party server without ever revealing the user's data. Currently, the CKKS scheme is the backbone of most efficient FHE implementations, but it only supports addition, multiplication, and array rotation operations, thus requiring all activation functions of the neural network to be appro

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 21 May 2026] Encrypted Neural Networks without Overflows Philipp Kern, Lorenzo Rovida, Samuel Teuber, Edoardo Manino, Carsten Sinz, Alberto Leporati Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables private inference by evaluating neural networks on encrypted data. In this way, we can delegate the computation to a third party server without ever revealing the user's data. Currently, the CKKS scheme is the backbone of most efficient FHE implementations, but it only supports addition, multiplication, and array rotation operations, thus requiring all activation functions of the neural network to be approximated by polynomials within a certain interval, imposing strict design tolerances. In this paper, we demonstrate for the first time that this scheme is vulnerable to overflow attacks, i.e., seemingly benign inputs that can exceed such tolerances of the FHE circuit, thereby causing corrupt and unusable outputs. To avoid them, we propose a formal verification technique that computes certified bounds on the ranges of all neurons in the network. By construction, our method eliminates overflows and, in our experiments, removed observed overflows on all benchmarks, reducing failure rates from up to 47% to 0%. Moreover, our overflow-free solution is compatible with most CKKS-based frameworks, as it allows to simply substitute standard polynomials by polynomials with rigorously designed ranges. Comments: Preprint Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2605.23096 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.23096v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23096 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Lorenzo Rovida [view email] [v1] Thu, 21 May 2026 23:08:23 UTC (846 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 25, 2026
    Archived
    May 25, 2026
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