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arXiv:2605.23096v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables private inference by evaluating neural networks on encrypted data. In this way, we can delegate the computation to a third party server without ever revealing the user's data. Currently, the CKKS scheme is the backbone of most efficient FHE implementations, but it only supports addition, multiplication, and array rotation operations, thus requiring all activation functions of the neural network to be appro
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 21 May 2026]
Encrypted Neural Networks without Overflows
Philipp Kern, Lorenzo Rovida, Samuel Teuber, Edoardo Manino, Carsten Sinz, Alberto Leporati
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables private inference by evaluating neural networks on encrypted data. In this way, we can delegate the computation to a third party server without ever revealing the user's data. Currently, the CKKS scheme is the backbone of most efficient FHE implementations, but it only supports addition, multiplication, and array rotation operations, thus requiring all activation functions of the neural network to be approximated by polynomials within a certain interval, imposing strict design tolerances. In this paper, we demonstrate for the first time that this scheme is vulnerable to overflow attacks, i.e., seemingly benign inputs that can exceed such tolerances of the FHE circuit, thereby causing corrupt and unusable outputs. To avoid them, we propose a formal verification technique that computes certified bounds on the ranges of all neurons in the network. By construction, our method eliminates overflows and, in our experiments, removed observed overflows on all benchmarks, reducing failure rates from up to 47% to 0%. Moreover, our overflow-free solution is compatible with most CKKS-based frameworks, as it allows to simply substitute standard polynomials by polynomials with rigorously designed ranges.
Comments: Preprint
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.23096 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.23096v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.23096
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Submission history
From: Lorenzo Rovida [view email]
[v1] Thu, 21 May 2026 23:08:23 UTC (846 KB)
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