TimeGuard: Channel-wise Pool Training for Backdoor Defense in Time Series Forecasting
arXiv SecurityArchived May 22, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.22365v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Time Series Forecasting (TSF) plays a critical role across many domains, yet it is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. However, backdoor defenses tailored to TSF remain underexplored, due to data entanglement and task-formulation shift challenges. To fill this gap, we conduct a systematic evaluation of thirteen representative backdoor defenses across the TSF life cycle and analyze their failure modes. Our results reveal two fundamental issues: (1) data
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 21 May 2026]
TimeGuard: Channel-wise Pool Training for Backdoor Defense in Time Series Forecasting
Quang Duc Nguyen, Siyuan Liang, Yiming Li, Fushuo Huo, Dacheng Tao
Time Series Forecasting (TSF) plays a critical role across many domains, yet it is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. However, backdoor defenses tailored to TSF remain underexplored, due to data entanglement and task-formulation shift challenges. To fill this gap, we conduct a systematic evaluation of thirteen representative backdoor defenses across the TSF life cycle and analyze their failure modes. Our results reveal two fundamental issues: (1) data entanglement induces channel-level signal dilution, rendering sample-filtering and trigger-synthesis defenses ineffective at localizing backdoors; and (2) task-formulation shift leads to training-loss degeneration, causing poisoned and clean windows to become indistinguishable at training stages. Based on these findings, we propose a training-time backdoor defense for TSF, termed TimeGuard. Our method adopts channel-wise pool training as the core paradigm and initializes a high-confidence pool using time-aware criteria to mitigate signal dilution. Moreover, we introduce distance-regularized loss selection to progressively expand the reliable pool during training and ease loss degeneration. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, forecasting architectures, and TSF backdoor attacks demonstrate that TimeGuard substantially improves robustness, boosting \mathrm{MAE}_\mathrm{P} by 1.96\times over the leading baseline, while preserving clean performance within 5% \mathrm{MAE}_\mathrm{C}.
Comments: 44 pages, 30 figures. ICML 2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.22365 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.22365v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.22365
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From: Quang Duc Nguyen [view email]
[v1] Thu, 21 May 2026 11:58:46 UTC (697 KB)
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