QT-PUF: Quantum Tunneling Leakage Based PUF for Implantable IoMT Devices
arXiv SecurityArchived May 22, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.22113v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) marks a shift toward decentralized healthcare, enabling continuous monitoring and personalized care through connected wearable and implantable devices. However, ensuring the trust and integrity of these devices themselves remains a major challenge, as physical compromise or counterfeiting can directly endanger patient safety, privacy, and data integrity. This work presents QT-PUF, a gate-tunneling-leakage-based
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 21 May 2026]
QT-PUF: Quantum Tunneling Leakage Based PUF for Implantable IoMT Devices
Yueqi Ma, Vivek Mohan, Chip-Hong Chang, Emmanuel M. Drakakis
The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) marks a shift toward decentralized healthcare, enabling continuous monitoring and personalized care through connected wearable and implantable devices. However, ensuring the trust and integrity of these devices themselves remains a major challenge, as physical compromise or counterfeiting can directly endanger patient safety, privacy, and data integrity. This work presents QT-PUF, a gate-tunneling-leakage-based physical unclonable function (PUF) that leverages quantum-mechanical gate leakage resulting from process-induced variations in standard CMOS devices. A differential readout circuit with a pseudo-resistor I-to-V frontend is proposed to convert the picoampere-level leakage variations into digital responses. Unlike existing PUFs such as those based on memory, ring oscillators, or arbiters, which are less suitable for ultralow-power IoMT devices (due to additional circuitry, power overhead, or poor stability), QT-PUF requires no external excitation or stabilization and operates under static bias. Simulation-based measurements for a \mathbf{65}~nm CMOS process demonstrate an entropy of \mathbf{0.9999998}, an FHD of \mathbf{0.5001}, and an average power (energy) consumption of \mathbf{96.04}~nW/bit (\mathbf{19.21}~fJ/bit, respectively) at \mathbf{1.2\,V} and \mathbf{35\,^{\circ}C} for the proposed PUF. It operates reliably across \mathbf{0.9}\text{--}\mathbf{1.3}~V and \mathbf{0}\text{--}\mathbf{100\,^{\circ}C} with an average BER below \mathbf{0.000163} across \mathbf{1.0}\text{--}\mathbf{1.3}~V and \mathbf{10}\text{--}\mathbf{70\,^{\circ}C} within the operating conditions of typical implantable devices.
Comments: The paper has been accepted for presentation at the 2026 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems in Shanghai
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.22113 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.22113v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.22113
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Submission history
From: Vivek Mohan [view email]
[v1] Thu, 21 May 2026 07:46:02 UTC (2,154 KB)
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