An Evidence-driven Protocol for Trustworthy CI Pipelines
arXiv SecurityArchived May 21, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.21089v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise software supply chains are increasingly vulnerable to infrastructure attacks, resulting in financial and reputational damage. Ensuring the integrity and provenance of software artifacts remains a significant challenge, where re-execution of the build and tests by every consumer to guarantee provenance produces a verification bottleneck and credibility reduction. This paper presents an evidence-driven protocol for trustworthy Continuous I
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 20 May 2026]
An Evidence-driven Protocol for Trustworthy CI Pipelines
Fernando Castillo, Eduardo Brito, Pille Pullonen-Raudvere, Sebastian Werner, Stefan Tai
Enterprise software supply chains are increasingly vulnerable to infrastructure attacks, resulting in financial and reputational damage. Ensuring the integrity and provenance of software artifacts remains a significant challenge, where re-execution of the build and tests by every consumer to guarantee provenance produces a verification bottleneck and credibility reduction. This paper presents an evidence-driven protocol for trustworthy Continuous Integration (CI) pipelines that combines Deterministic Build Systems (DBS) with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). The approach provides cryptographically verifiable guarantees of integrity, authenticity, and attestation for CI artifacts in distributed environments, reducing implicit trust without requiring costly re-execution by consumers. We introduce a protocol that binds deterministic builds with TEE-based attestations, formalizing the evidence life cycle, together with a practical implementation using Nix and Intel TDX. Experimental results show that artifact verification is reduced from redundant computation to lightweight signature and policy checks. These findings demonstrate that evidence-driven CI pipelines establish scalable and verifiable trust in digital infrastructure, effectively amortizing the initial computational overhead introduced by TEEs.
Comments: To be published in International Conference on Enterprise Design, Operations, and Computing 2026 (EDOC 2026), 18 pages, 4 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.21089 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.21089v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.21089
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Submission history
From: Fernando Castillo [view email]
[v1] Wed, 20 May 2026 12:22:20 UTC (1,172 KB)
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