arXiv SecurityArchived May 21, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.20759v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Single-turn safety evaluation is a poor proxy for real fraud defense, where attackers escalate across multiple rounds. This paper evaluates fraud defenders under replay and adaptive multi-round attacks and measures when a defender refuses, not just whether it eventually refuses. On a frozen multi-round suite built from Fraud-R1, graph-context defenders improve early safe refusal relative to text-only baselines under both replay and adaptive fraud p
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 20 May 2026]
Rethinking Fraud Safety Evaluation: Multi-Round Attacks Reveal Safety-Utility Tradeoffs in Graph-Context LLM Defenders
Laura Jiang, Reza Ryan, Qian Li, Nasim Ferdosian
Single-turn safety evaluation is a poor proxy for real fraud defense, where attackers escalate across multiple rounds. This paper evaluates fraud defenders under replay and adaptive multi-round attacks and measures when a defender refuses, not just whether it eventually refuses. On a frozen multi-round suite built from Fraud-R1, graph-context defenders improve early safe refusal relative to text-only baselines under both replay and adaptive fraud pressure, but they also produce substantially more benign over-refusal. Direct probing of the trained graph encoder, together with paired shuffle-risk ablations on both fraud and benign sides replicated across two seeds on the Qwen-1.5B backbone, localises this cost to how the defender LLM consumes structured context rather than to graph-encoder quality: the encoder cleanly separates fraud from benign, while the LLM responds primarily to the presence of structured graph fields and only secondarily, and asymmetrically, to risk-score magnitude. Temporal graph context is directionally stronger than static and significantly better grounded, but is not yet conclusively superior on the main refusal metrics. The contribution is evaluative and measurement-oriented: robust fraud assessment must be multi-round, must report refusal timing, must account for benign false positives alongside fraud-side safety gains, and must localize observed costs to the graph signal or to how the LLM consumes it.
Comments: 19 pages, 3 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.20759 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.20759v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.20759
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Shan Jiang [view email]
[v1] Wed, 20 May 2026 05:59:54 UTC (51 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-05
Change to browse by:
cs
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)